Santa Clara Law Review
Volume 55 | Number 1

Article 2

10-7-2015

Regulatory Theory and the Enforcement of the
Financial Protections of the Servicemembers Civil
Relief Act
Kirk D. Jensen

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/lawreview
Recommended Citation
Kirk D. Jensen, Regulatory Theory and the Enforcement of the Financial Protections of the Servicemembers Civil Relief Act, 55 Santa Clara
L. Rev. 53 (2015).
Available at: http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/lawreview/vol55/iss1/2

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Santa Clara Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Santa
Clara Law Review by an authorized administrator of Santa Clara Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
sculawlibrarian@gmail.com.

REGULATORY THEORY AND THE ENFORCEMENT
OF THE FINANCIAL PROTECTIONS OF THE
SERVICEMEMBERS CIVIL RELIEF ACT
Kirk D. Jensen*
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Introduction............................................................................. 54
I. Characteristics of Agency Behavior .................................... 57
A. Tendency toward Increasingly Aggressive
Interpretations ........................................................ 58
B. Tunnel Vision .......................................................... 65
C. Evaluation of Marginal Costs and Benefits ........... 66
D. Short-Term Bias ...................................................... 68
II. The History and Evolution of the SCRA’s Balancing of
Servicemember and Creditor Interests ......................... 68
A. Pre-1918 Moratory Legislation ............................... 70
B. The Soldiers’ and Sailors’ Civil Relief Act of
1918 ......................................................................... 71
C. Soldiers’ and Sailors’ Civil Relief Act of 1940......... 76
D. Developments Between 1942 and 2003 .................. 78
E. The Servicemembers Civil Relief Act of 2003......... 82
F. Post-2003 Amendments .......................................... 83
G. The Central Concept: Material Effect .................... 85
III. The SCRA and Aggressive Enforcement .......................... 87
A. Strict Liability: A New Standard ............................ 88
B. Strict Liability in Government Enforcement ......... 95
C. Expansion of Liability Under the SCRA ................ 99
1. Expansion of the Scope of Default Judgment
Protection ......................................................... 100
2. Expansion of the Interest Rate Protection ...... 109
D. Expansion of Liability and the Rule of Lenity ..... 120
IV. The Costs of Upsetting the Balance................................ 124
* Partner, BuckleySandler LLP, Washington, DC. B.A., Brigham Young
University; J.D., Duke University School of Law.

53

54

SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW

[Vol: 55

Conclusion ............................................................................. 128

INTRODUCTION
In observing the behavior of regulatory agencies,
scholars have observed many bureaucratic tendencies and
biases that often influence agency decision making. Even
well-intentioned agencies acting in good faith may be
influenced by these predilections because they are a result of
human
cognitive
processes
and
naturally-occurring
1
incentives. Scholars have identified many such tendencies
and biases, including (1) the tendency for agencies to take
increasingly aggressive interpretations of the laws they
administer; (2) a tunnel vision and selection bias resulting in
a myopic focus on regulatory mission; (3) a limited ability to
evaluate the marginal costs and benefits of actions, including
a discounting of externalized costs; and (4) a bias toward
short-term goals even at the expense of long-term costs. 2
The tendency toward aggressive administration can
lead a regulatory agency to overextend, or take an overly
muscular view of the laws it enforces in ways that may be
inconsistent with broader public policy or even with the goals
of the legislation itself. The tunnel vision bias can lead an
agency to focus so closely on advancing its own regulatory
agenda that it pays inadequate attention to costs that its
actions may impose in other areas and that may impede other
important policy goals. The limited ability to measure
marginal costs and benefits can lead an agency to overvalue
those marginal benefits consistent with its regulatory
mission, while undervaluing the costs that are external to its
regulatory purview. And the short-term bias can cause an
agency to focus primarily or exclusively on the short-term
gains of its actions while giving less attention to the longerterm implications of its actions.
1. See, e.g., Rachel E. Barkow, Prosecutorial Administration: Prosecutor
Bias and the Department of Justice, 99 VA. L. REV. 271, 313–14 (2013) (noting
that cognitive biases do not evidence bad faith, but instead arise from “common
human development.”).
2. See, e.g., Todd J. Zywicki, Institutional Review Boards as Academic
Bureaucracies: An Economic and Experiential Analysis, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 861,
872 (2007).
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These identified bureaucratic tendencies are useful in
understanding agency decision making in connection with the
many recent agency actions enforcing the financial
protections of the Servicemembers Civil Relief Act (SCRA). 3
The
SCRA
provides
wide-reaching
protections
to
4
servicemembers —defined generally in the SCRA as any
member of the uniformed services, including the U.S. armed
forces 5—regarding consumer financial products, such as
mortgages, credit cards, automobile loans, student loans, real
estate and automobile leases, and more. 6 Although the SCRA
languished in regulatory obscurity for many years, it is not
surprising that—with over two million active duty
servicemembers and National Guard and Reserve
members 7—the Act’s financial services protections have been
the source of intense scrutiny in recent years. Since 2011,
federal law enforcement and regulatory agencies have
3. Servicemembers Civil Relief Act, 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 501–515, 516–597b
(2012) (effective Dec. 19, 2003).
4. Although use of the term “service member” would ordinarily be
grammatically correct, this Article will use “servicemember” throughout in
order to be consistent with the statute.
5. 50 U.S.C. app. § 511(1); 10 U.S.C. § 101(a)(5). The term “uniformed
services” is defined to include members of the armed forces, as well as the
commissioned corps of the Public Health Service and National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration. 10 U.S.C. § 101(a)(5). The SCRA’s protections
generally apply to servicemembers in “military service,” which includes active
duty in the uniformed services, as well as active National Guard service in cases
where the call to service is authorized by the President or Secretary of Defense,
supported by federal funds, and meets other criteria. 50 U.S.C. app. § 511(2).
“Active duty” extends beyond deployment, and includes many members of the
full-time armed forces serving within the continental United States. 10 U.S.C. §
101(d)(1).
6. The SCRA provides wide-reaching protections to servicemembers
regarding consumer financial products and services. These include limitations
on the rate of interest on a credit obligation the servicemember incurs prior to
military service, limitations on the foreclosure and repossession of collateral
securing a credit obligation, the ability to terminate leases on premises and
automobiles, and protections regarding eviction of a servicemember and his or
her dependents from a rental property. 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 531–35 (2012). The
Act also provides important procedural protections for servicemembers,
including protections regarding default judgments, the ability to stay civil
proceedings when military service materially affects the servicemember’s ability
to participate in a proceeding, and the tolling of statutes of limitation and
periods to redeem real property. Id. §§ 521–26.
7. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-14-221, SERVICEMEMBERS
CIVIL RELIEF ACT: INFORMATION ON MORTGAGE PROTECTIONS AND RELATED
EDUCATION EFFORTS 8 (2014) [hereinafter GAO SCRA REPORT], available at
http://www.gao.gov/assets/670/660398.pdf.
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entered into over twenty public settlements with financial
institutions resulting in hundreds of millions of dollars in
remediation and penalties. 8 Other non-public actions have
increased the total amount even further.
The U.S.
Department of Justice has also brought criminal prosecutions
against individuals it alleged violated the financial
protections of the SCRA. 9 Recent statements by federal and
state enforcement agencies indicate that this scrutiny has not
abated and will not abate in the near future. 10 And other
government agencies continue to scrutinize the Act and the
financial protections it provides to servicemembers. 11 This
government scrutiny is in addition to ongoing private
litigation over SCRA issues. 12
While the SCRA was obviously intended to protect
servicemembers, it was also carefully designed to balance
servicemember interests with the legitimate interests of
servicemembers’ creditors. 13 Unlike previous laws placing
absolute moratoria on actions against servicemembers, the
SCRA permits actions against servicemembers except in
cases where the servicemember’s military service materially
affects the servicemember’s ability to protect his or her
8. See infra Part III.
9. See, e.g., David Palmer, Cullman Used Car Dealer Indicted in Federal
Court,
CULLMAN
TIMES
(Mar.
28,
2013),
http://www.cullmantimes.com/local/x237731114/Cullman-used-car-dealerindicted-in-federal-court.
10. See, e.g., Press Release, State of Del. News, Biden: Financial
Institutions Must Follow Financial Laws Protecting Military Personnel (Oct. 3,
2013),
available
at
http://news.delaware.gov/2013/10/03/biden-financialinstitutions-must-follow-financial-laws-protecting-military-personnel/
(demanding information from “nearly 30 leading lending institutions” regarding
SCRA compliance and urging federal law makers to give state attorneys general
authority to prosecute violations of the SCRA); CONSUMER FINANCIAL
PROTECTION BUREAU, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE CFPB STUDENT LOAN
OMBUDSMAN
7
(Oct.
16,
2013),
available
at
http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201310_cfpb_student-loan-ombudsmanannual-report.pdf (noting ongoing complaints that “a number of market
[student loan] participants were making improper demands of active-duty
servicemembers seeking benefits under the Servicemembers Civil Relief Act”
and committing that “[t]he CFPB will continue to work closely with bank
regulators and the U.S. Department of Justice to ensure that the law is being
followed and violators are held accountable.”).
11. See, e.g., GAO SCRA REPORT, supra note 7.
12. E.g., Jimenez v. Miami-Dade Cnty., No. 1:11-cv-23131-SCOLA (S.D. Fla.
Jan. 18, 2013).
13. See infra Part II.
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interests or to comply with his or her obligations. But as
regulatory theorists may predict, the agencies enforcing the
SCRA have aggressively enforced the Act solely with a focus
on benefitting servicemembers, giving short shrift to the
balancing of interests central to the Act and the potential
costs of these aggressive enforcement positions. This Article
for the first time examines the positions adopted by the
agencies enforcing the SCRA and shows that too many of
these positions are inconsistent with the purpose, structure,
and text of the SCRA itself. In so doing, this Article provides
additional support for several of the bureaucratic tendencies
observed by regulatory theorists.
This Article begins by focusing on the four
bureaucratic tendencies identified above that are useful in
understanding the agencies’ SCRA enforcement actions and
positions taken therein. Next, because understanding the
balancing of servicemember and creditor interests built into
the SCRA is critical to understanding the agency departure
from that balancing of interests, this Article includes a
discussion of the history and evolution of the SCRA, showing
that for nearly a century the Act has been designed to balance
servicemember and creditor interests.
Following that
discussion, the Article discusses recent SCRA enforcement
decisions, and shows that many of the public and non-public
positions on SCRA provisions taken by the agencies are
inconsistent with the purpose and structure of the Act—and,
in some cases, inconsistent with the statutory text itself. This
result is consistent with regulatory theory’s observations
regarding bureaucratic tendencies and biases. Finally, the
Article will discuss some of the external costs imposed by the
agencies’ enforcement of the SCRA that do not appear to have
factored into the agencies’ decision making.
I.

CHARACTERISTICS OF AGENCY BEHAVIOR

Regulatory theorists have identified many tendencies
that can affect a regulatory agency’s decision making
processes for better or worse. 14 Some are the result of various
incentives operating on the agency, some may be the result of
cognitive biases that influence all human decision making,
14. E.g., Zywicki, supra note 2, at 872–78 (discussing factors that may
contribute to poor decision making in governmental bureaucracies).
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and some may have other root causes. Four of these
tendencies in particular are useful in understanding agency
behavior in SCRA enforcement actions. These are the
tendency toward an agency taking increasingly aggressive
positions in interpreting and enforcing the statutes under the
agency’s purview; a tunnel vision resulting in a myopic focus
on regulatory mission; a limited ability to evaluate the
marginal costs and benefits of actions, including a
discounting of externalized costs; and a bias toward shortterm goals even at the expense of long-term costs. It is
important to note that while these predilections can have
profound impact on agency decision making, they do not
suggest bad faith on the part of any particular decision
maker. While bad faith may be a risk in the case of any
decision maker, the bureaucratic tendencies discussed below
are a natural part of the human condition and therefore may
influence agency decision making even when decision makers
are well-intentioned and are making sincere efforts to achieve
favorable policy results as they see them.
A. Tendency toward Increasingly Aggressive
Interpretations
Government agencies have a natural tendency to take
increasingly aggressive positions both in seeking to expand
the agency’s jurisdiction and in interpreting and applying the
laws the agency administers. This tendency is largely the
result of a variety of incentives that exist at both the agency
and individual decision maker levels.
Scholars have argued that public entities respond to
many of the same incentives to act in a self-interested fashion
as private entities—including the incentive to try to maximize
the financial recoveries from enforcement actions. 15 This
position may seem counterintuitive, particularly given that
public-sector employees—including decision makers at
administrative agencies—are paid on salary. Thus, publicsector decision makers may not stand to profit financially in
the same way that private sector employees would. For
example, if counsel representing a class of plaintiffs helps her
clients achieve a large cash award or settlement, counsel also
15. See, e.g., Margaret H. Lemos & Max Minzner, For-Profit Public
Enforcement, 127 HARV. L. REV. 853, 856–57 (2014).
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generally will be handsomely compensated. 16 But counsel
representing a government agency who helps the agency
achieve a large cash award or settlement—whether the funds
pass entirely to others, or part or all is retained by the
agency—generally will not profit monetarily for her success.
That does not mean, however, that government
agencies and those who work for them are not also strongly
incentivized to maximize financial recoveries.
Where
agencies are entitled to retain a portion or all of the recovery,
the agency has an obvious monetary incentive to maximize
recoveries.
Whether this added revenue supplements
legislative appropriations, or offsets reduced appropriations,
the impact on the agency’s ability to maintain its activities
and staffing levels can be significant. 17 And even where
agencies do not retain all or part of the recovery, the agency
remains highly incentivized to maximize recoveries. Agencies
are incentivized by reputational awards as well as monetary
ones. An agency’s reputation for being a strong and effective
enforcement agency can provide important benefits to the
agency in terms of oversight by legislatures and executive
officials, deference from judges, and perception of the public
generally. 18
This incentive may be particularly powerful for
agencies previously accused of inadequate oversight of their
respective stewardships. For example, the federal banking
16. Indeed, in some cases the resolution of class action litigation enriches
the plaintiffs’ lawyers while class members receive only a coupon. See, e.g.,
Christopher R. Leslie, A Market-Based Approach to Coupon Settlements in
Antitrust and Consumer Class Action Litigation, 49 UCLA L. REV. 991 (2002)
(demonstrating that coupons issued in coupon-based settlements are
increasingly being structured to resemble promotional coupons, “making the
settlement worthless to many (and sometimes most) class members.”); David A.
Dana, Public Interest and Private Lawyers: Toward a Normative Evaluation of
Parens Patriae Litigation by Contingency Fee, 51 DEPAUL L. REV. 315, 327
(2001) (“In a number of consumer fraud class actions, the lawyers negotiated
deals, which some courts approved, in which class members received coupons of
little real economic value, and the plaintiffs’ lawyers received millions of dollars
calculated based on the purely nominal value of the coupons.”); Jean R.
Sternlight, As Mandatory Binding Arbitration Meets the Class Action, Will the
Class Action Survive?, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 34 (2000) (“The ‘coupon’ class
actions have become symbolic of this concern, with class members receiving a
few coupons toward the purchase of a new car, airline ticket, or dog food, while
class attorneys reap large fees.”).
17. Lemos & Minzner, supra note 15, at 864–71.
18. Id. at 877–78.
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agencies have been subjected to withering public scrutiny
regarding their efforts to ensure SCRA compliance. In
January 2011, JPMorgan Chase announced that it had “made
mistakes” in compliance with the SCRA’s foreclosure and
interest rate cap protections. 19 This announcement quickly
led the House Committee on Veterans’ Affairs to hold
hearings on alleged SCRA violations. 20 During this hearing,
members of the plaintiffs’ bar testified of the SCRA violations
they claimed to have seen during their representations of
servicemembers. 21 This increased scrutiny subsequently led
to a report by the Government Accountability Office, which
concluded that regulatory oversight of financial institutions’
SCRA compliance was limited. 22 Under such scrutiny, it
should come as no surprise that the regulatory agencies
tasked with SCRA oversight and enforcement—the federal
banking agencies and the Department of Justice—would have
strong incentives to demonstrate renewed and increased
vigilance in ensuring SCRA compliance by bringing public
enforcement actions. It is no coincidence that the first, in
what has become a long line of SCRA enforcement actions,
was settled just a few months after the Committee hearings
on alleged SCRA violations. 23 It should also come as no
surprise that regulatory agencies would seek to demonstrate
this renewed vigilance by seeking large monetary recoveries.
Scholars have observed that all else being equal, agencies will
Thus,
emphasize more easily measured metrics. 24
enforcement agencies seeking to build or rehabilitate
reputations as strong and effective will naturally gravitate
19. E.g., Karen Jowers, Chase Spends $2M to Fix Errors on Military
Mortgages,
USA
TODAY
(Jan.
21,
2011),
http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/money/economy/housing/2011-01-21-millitarymortgage-blunder_N.htm.
20. Alleged Violations of the Servicemembers Civil Relief Act: Hearing Before
the H. Comm. on Veterans’ Affairs, 112th Cong. 1 (2011).
21. See id. at 66–68 (statement of Richard A. Harpootlian); id. at 82–83
(statement of Col. John S. Odom, Jr.).
22. See generally U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-12-700,
MORTGAGE FORECLOSURES: REGULATORY OVERSIGHT OF COMPLIANCE WITH THE
SERVICEMEMBERS CIVIL RELIEF ACT HAS BEEN LIMITED 19–20 (2012)
[hereinafter GAO MORTGAGE FORECLOSURES].
23. See infra notes 212–217 and accompanying text.
24. See generally Eric Biber, Too Many Things to Do: How to Deal with the
Dysfunctions of Multiple-Goal Agencies, 33 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 12 n.30
(2009) (citing studies).

2015]

SERVICEMEMBERS CIVIL RELIEF ACT

61

toward more easily measured forms of success. 25 And few
measures of success are as easily measured as win rates and
financial recoveries. 26 Indeed, because financial recoveries
are stated in dollar amounts, they are easily understood and
digested, are generally indisputable, and are easily
comparable. 27 Unlike win rates and other metrics, financial
recoveries convey information about the magnitude and
importance of the agency’s enforcement activities. 28 Agency
focus on financial recoveries is perhaps most easily observed
in the captions of the press releases announcing various
settlements of SCRA-related enforcement actions, which
typically trumpet the amount of financial recovery. 29 Because
other aspects of enforcement actions are less easily
quantifiable (e.g., forward-looking changes in a company’s
policies and practices), the amount of financial recovery takes
on particular significance for enforcement agencies. 30
Of course, government agencies are not sentient
beings; agency actions are determined and conducted by
individuals. The incentives of individual agency employees
are complicated and have been the subject of substantial
scholarly focus. 31 The general perception has been that
25. See Jonathan R. Macey, The Distorting Incentives Facing the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission, 33 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 639, 639
(2010) (“[T]he SEC tends to pursue high profile matters, to change its priorities
frequently in accordance with public opinion, and perhaps most significantly, to
pursue readily observable objectives, often at the expense of more important but
less observable objectives.”).
26. See, e.g., id. at 644–45; Lemos & Minzner, supra note 15, at 876.
27. Lemos & Minzner, supra note 15, at 876.
28. Id. at 877.
29. See, e.g., Press Release, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys.,
Amendments to Consent Orders Memorialize $9.3 Billion Foreclosure
Agreement
(Feb.
28,
2013),
available
at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/enforcement/20130228a.htm;
Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Service Members to Receive $39 Million for
Violations of the Servicemembers Civil Relief Act (Apr. 4, 2013), available at
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2013/April/13-crt-383.html; Press Release, U.S.
Dep’t of Justice, $25 Billion Mortgage Servicing Agreement Filed in Federal
Court
(Mar.
12,
2012),
available
at
https://d9klfgibkcquc.cloudfront.net/Settlement-USDOJ-FILING-newsrelease.pdf.
30. Lemos & Minzner, supra note 15, at 876.
31. See, e.g., WILLIAM A. NISKANEN, JR., BUREAUCRACY AND
REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT 36–42 (1971) (stating that theories of
government agencies must take into account the personal preferences of
bureaucrats); JAMES Q. WILSON, BUREAUCRACY: WHAT GOVERNMENT AGENCIES
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agency employees, including enforcement counsel, have “low
powered” incentives relative to private-sector employees. 32
However, Professors Lemos and Minzner have recently
argued that agency enforcement attorneys, whether career or
non-career, also have strong incentives to achieve large
These
financial recoveries in enforcement actions. 33
incentives may affect even the best-intentioned agency
personnel. These include the incentive to increase their
desirability to current and future employers (particularly for
non-career counsel who may be eyeing a move to the privatesector), and the incentive to enhance their individual internal
and external reputations. 34
These agency and individual incentives naturally lead
to action. And the incentives influence agency action in
predictable ways. First, agency and individual incentives can
lead to an increased volume of enforcement activity. When
the agency has a financial or reputational incentive to pursue
financial recovery through enforcement, agency officials will
be inclined to initiate more enforcement actions. 35 Second,
these incentives can influence the type of remedies sought.
While forward-looking injunctive relief may provide for
greater public benefit in many cases, it is inherently more
difficult to measure and provides less short-term reward to
the agency. For example, if SCRA enforcement actions
increase SCRA compliance throughout the financial services
industry, it is unlikely that the absence of SCRA claims five
years in the future will result in increased recognition or
accolades to the enforcement agencies. But large financial
recoveries provide significant recognition immediately.
Accordingly, all else being equal, one would expect that both
financial and reputational incentives would shift agency
efforts toward greater financial recoveries. 36
A focus on financial recovery can be increased by

DO AND WHY THEY DO IT, at x (1989) (noting that economic and political
scientists have recognized that bureaucrats, like entrepreneurs, seek to
maximize their utility).
32. See, e.g., Lemos & Minzner, supra note 15, at 887–89 (summarizing
research).
33. Lemos & Minzner, supra note 15, at 893.
34. Id. at 891–94.
35. Id. at 896–98.
36. Id. at 898–900.
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competition among administrative agencies. Where multiple
agencies have overlapping jurisdiction, one can expect that
the financial and reputational incentives of enforcement
actions can lead to competition among agencies, particularly
competition with respect to recovery amounts. 37 In the SCRA
enforcement context, this is evident in the remediation
frameworks established by different federal enforcement
agencies. The SCRA provides that the Department of Justice
may seek penalties of up to $55,000 for a first violation, and
up to $110,000 for subsequent violations. 38 But in the April
2012 National Mortgage Settlement, 39 the Department of
Justice increased the penalty amount to $116,785 per
violation (plus any additional amount representing equity lost
by the borrower). 40 Not to be outdone, in June 2012, the
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) and the
Federal Reserve Board announced a remediation framework
for use in the Independent Foreclosure Review that further
increased the SCRA per-violation penalty to $125,000 (plus
The agencies did not provide a public
lost equity). 41
explanation for the successive increases over the statutory
cap of $110,000 per violation, but inter-agency competition
would appear to be the most likely explanation.
These incentives also lead regulatory agencies to seek
to expand their power and influence within whatever
constraints and counter-incentives exist within the
institutional framework in which they operate. This tendency
can manifest itself in a sort of “empire building,” through
which the agency seeks to expand its jurisdiction and sphere
But it can also manifest itself in an
of influence. 42
increasingly aggressive assertion of the laws the agency is
empowered to enforce. Scholars have similarly identified this
tendency in specialty tribunals, such as the Federal Circuit
Court of Appeals, which tend to adopt an overly muscular
37. Id. at 901–03.
38. Servicemembers Civil Relief Act, 50 U.S.C. app. § 597b (2012).
39. See infra notes 221–32 and accompanying text.
40. Consent Judgment § II(a)(1) Ex. H at 3–4, United States v. Bank of Am.
Corp., No. 1:12-cv-00361-RMC (D.D.C. Apr. 4, 2012).
41. Office of the Comptroller of the Currency & Bd. of Governors of the Fed.
Reserve Sys., Financial Remediation Framework for Use in the Independent
Foreclosure
Review,
at
2
(June
21,
2012),
available
at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/bcreg/bcreg20120621b2.pdf.
42. Zywicki, supra note 2, at 872–74.
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view of the laws entrusted to them. 43 And, of course, an
aggressive interpretation of the laws it administers can
contribute to the agency achieving greater financial and
reputational awards in more cases—particularly if that
aggressive interpretation is applied retroactively through an
enforcement action.
A tendency to take increasingly aggressive positions in
interpreting a statute through enforcement may be
exacerbated if the agency views the risk of losing in litigation
as minimal. 44 SCRA enforcement may be a case study of this
principle. Servicemembers are held in high esteem by the
majority of Americans. They have also been defined as a
vulnerable population under the Dodd-Frank Act. 45 Financial
institutions, on the other hand, generally have not been
considered sympathetic defendants in recent years. 46
Financial institutions must exercise caution in litigating
SCRA issues against servicemembers because such actions,
even if the institution believes them to be completely justified
and consistent with the Act, may be portrayed by those
opposing the financial institution as an effort to erode
servicemember protections. The negative public relations
risk of appearing anti-servicemember is significant. And this
risk likely would be heightened if the opponent in such
litigation is a government agency, which no doubt would
broadcast its efforts as motivated solely by desires to protect
servicemember interests. It is no surprise that no financial
43. E.g., John M. Golden, The Supreme Court as “Prime Percolator”: A
Prescription for Appellate Review of Questions in Patent Law, 56 UCLA L. REV.
657, 659 (2009).
44. E.g., Zywicki, supra note 2, at 873 (“[R]egulators’ decisions as to when
and how to intervene are understood to result from the interplay between the
pursuit of their own self-interests and the constraints and incentives created by
the institutional framework in which they operate.”).
45. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L.
No. 111-203, § 1013(e), 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (creating the Office of
Servicemember Affairs to assist military families); but see Creola Johnson,
Congress Protected the Troops: Can the New CFPB Protect Civilians from
Payday Lending?, 69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 649, 675–76 (2012) (arguing that
military families enjoy financial benefits that exceed those enjoyed by civilians,
including health care benefits, tax advantages, and housing).
46. E.g., Laura Alix, Credit Unions Reporting Steady Loan Growth, BANKER
& TRADESMAN (Sept. 22, 2013) (reporting that “banks are still battling negative
PR and the perception that all banks operate like the behemoths that
contributed
to
the
financial
crisis.”),
available
at
http://www.bankerandtradesman.com/news156618.html.
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institution has litigated SCRA issues with government
agencies. And agency officials are no doubt aware of this
dynamic. It seems likely, therefore, that SCRA enforcement
may be an area where enforcement officials are even more
emboldened to take aggressive positions because of the
perceived minimal risk of losing in court.
B. Tunnel Vision
Just as an agency’s decision making may be influenced
by incentives that lead it to take increasingly aggressive
positions, it may also be influenced by tunnel vision, a focus
on the agency’s regulatory agenda to the exclusion of other
important social and policy goals. 47 This myopic focus—
similar to the concept of “escalation of commitment” studied
in psychology and management 48—is hardly surprising.
Specific agencies have specific spheres of responsibility and
areas of expertise. The agency and its resources will be
focused on accomplishing its regulatory mission. 49 Other
competing goals that are not part of that regulatory mission
will receive less if any attention. And the subject matter
expertise may not lend itself to considering other costs or
implications of regulatory positions. Indeed, the Department
of Justice itself has noted that other agencies may be too
prone to tunnel vision, focusing only, or primarily, on the
agency’s own interests to the potential detriment of other
public policy concerns. 50 For example, Professor Zywicki has
noted that an environmental enforcement agency may be
poorly suited to evaluate—and may not even consider—the
impact its environmental policy decisions may have on
47. E.g., Stephen Breyer, The Executive Branch, Administrative Action, and
Comparative Expertise, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 2189, 2195 (2011) (concluding that
agency decisions may reflect “ ‘ tunnel vision,’ an agency’s supreme confidence in
the importance of its own mission to the point where it leaves common sense
aside.”).
48. E.g., Jon B. Gould et al., Predicting Erroneous Convictions, 99 IOWA L.
REV. 471, 504 n.82 (2014) (collecting studies).
49. E.g., David B. Spence & Frank Cross, A Public Choice Case for the
Administrative State, 89 GEO. L.J. 97, 119 (2000) (“That agencies are
systematically more loyal to their basic mission seems persuasive, even
obvious.”).
50. E.g., Neal Devins & Saikrishna Prakash, The Indefensible Duty to
Defend, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 507, 539 (2012) (discussing concerns about tunnel
vision among the DOJ’s justifications for centralized government litigation
control).
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matters outside its sphere, such as on economic development
or national security. 51 And scholars have observed that this
tunnel vision may be exacerbated in adversarial
proceedings. 52 Thus, one would expect the tunnel vision
tendency to be heightened in enforcement actions relative to
rulemakings.
A selection bias in hiring may also exacerbate this
tendency. It seems obvious that employees of an agency are
more likely to be sympathetic to, rather than skeptical of, the
agency’s mission. 53 A person who believes in the mission of
the agency, and is more willing to carry out that mission, is
more likely to seek employment at the agency than a person
who is not. And the good feelings and emotional satisfaction
resulting from the employee’s commitment to the agency’s
mission may help offset the reduced monetary income of
working for a government agency relative to the private
sector. 54 Thus, those who believe in the agency’s mission
generally will carry out that mission, heightening the
tendency to focus narrowly on the agency’s mission to the
exclusion of other goals and ends. This selection bias may
also increase the tendency toward adopting increasingly
aggressive interpretations of the laws the agency administers,
since those who are most committed to an agency’s mission
would be more prone to trying to expand that mission.
C. Evaluation of Marginal Costs and Benefits
Regulatory theorists also observe that regulatory
agencies tend to experience difficulties in estimating the
marginal costs and benefits of regulatory action. This is
largely because the costs of agency action often do not fall
In
upon the agency, but rather on private parties. 55
recognition of this limitation, Congress and executive officials
51. E.g., Todd J. Zywicki, Environmental Externalities and Political
Externalities: The Political Economy of Environmental Regulation and Reform,
73 TUL. L. REV. 845, 893 (1999).
52. See generally Keith A. Findley & Michael S. Scott, The Multiple
Dimensions of Tunnel Vision in Criminal Cases, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 291 (2006).
53. Spence & Cross, supra note 49, at 119 (“People who are sympathetic to
that mission are more likely to be attracted to work at the agency.”).
54. See, e.g., Zywicki, supra note 2, at 877 (discussing psychic and monetary
income in selection bias); Lemos & Minzner, supra note 15, at 889 (comparing
income for government lawyers with first year associates at large law firms).
55. E.g., Zywicki, supra note 2, at 875.
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have taken several steps to increase agency awareness of the
costs imposed by regulatory actions. For example, President
Clinton issued Executive Order 12866, which required
agencies to assess the costs and benefits of intended
regulations. 56 Additionally, the Regulatory Right-To-Know
Act requires the Office of Management and Budget to prepare
annual reports to Congress regarding the costs of federal
regulations. 57 But the same type and level of cost-benefit
analysis and public disclosure is not applicable to
enforcement actions. Although enforcement agencies are
expected to determine the public benefit of an enforcement
action, including any deterrent on undesired conduct, the
financial and reputational incentives will no doubt be factored
(consciously or not) into this analysis. 58
This limitation on ability to evaluate benefits and
costs may be exacerbated when the potential costs are in
spheres outside the agency’s jurisdiction and expertise. As
noted above, an environmental regulatory agency may be
poorly suited to evaluate, if it even considers, the costs of its
environmental policy decisions on areas outside its area of
expertise, such as economic development and national
security. 59 Another example illustrating the limited ability of
agencies to evaluate marginal costs involves the FDA’s
limitations on manufacturers’ ability to communicate correct
information about the effects of their products. The FDA did
not, however, factor into its decisions the impact its
limitations had on the First Amendment rights of these
manufacturers—an oversight for which courts subsequently
took the FDA to task. 60

56. Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (Oct. 4, 1993) (“Each agency
shall assess both the costs and the benefits of the intended regulation and,
recognizing that some costs and benefits are difficult to quantify, propose or
adopt a regulation only upon a reasoned determination that the benefits of the
intended regulation justify its costs.”).
57. Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2001, Pub. L. No. 106-554, § 1(a)(3)
[Title VI, § 624], 114 Stat. 2763, 2763A-161 (2000).
58. Lemos & Minzner, supra note 15, at 897–98 (arguing that an agency’s
cost-benefit analysis will be affected by the agency’s potential self-interest in
the enforcement action).
59. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
60. See Zywicki, supra note 2, at 877–78 (discussing cases).
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D. Short-Term Bias
A fourth tendency scholars have identified in
regulatory agencies is a bias toward focusing on short-term
results over longer-term effects. This cognitive bias is not a
result of bad faith, but is a natural tendency to focus on shortterm goals such as winning cases and maximizing recovery. 61
It is also a natural result of the incentives of administrative
agencies.
Agencies function in a political world which
prioritizes public results. Short-term gains, particularly
those that can be counted in dollars, make more public and
political impact than longer-term welfare improvements.
Political officials may hold their positions only until the next
election or administration change. Accordingly, they may be
more inclined, whether intentionally or not, to support
enforcement officials who achieve short-term results that are
readily identifiable and easily quantifiable. Even agency
officials who would consciously prefer long-term welfare
maximization may suffer from this cognitive bias, leading to
an inadvertent focus on short-term over long-term benefits. 62
This bias may affect the evaluation of costs as well as
benefits. This may be particularly true when the benefit is
immediate but the cost is borne over the long term. 63
II.

THE HISTORY AND EVOLUTION OF THE SCRA’S
BALANCING OF SERVICEMEMBER AND CREDITOR
INTERESTS

One of the ways the bureaucratic tendencies identified
by regulatory theorists has been exhibited by the agencies’
SCRA enforcement efforts is in the agencies’ departure from
the SCRA’s balancing of servicemember and creditor
interests. As was true of its predecessor legislation, the
SCRA is obviously intended to benefit servicemembers and
their dependents. 64 Servicemembers face serious challenges
61. See, e.g., Barkow, supra note 1, at 313–14 (citing studies).
62. E.g., James C. Cooper & William E. Kovacic, Behavioral Economics and
Its Meaning for Antitrust Agency Decision Making, 8 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 779,
795 (2012).
63. Cooper & Kovacic, supra note 62, at 782.
64. See, e.g., James P. Pottorff, Contemporary Applications of the Soldiers’
and Sailors’ Civil Relief Act, 132 MIL. L. REV. 115, 116 (1991) (“The premise
underlying the SSCRA is that service members should not be disadvantaged
either legally or financially when called to active service.”).
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when they enter military service, particularly those who are
called by their nation to leave civilian life to enter the
military. As one commentator observed, “active military
service may cause severe, often insurmountable, problems in
handling personal affairs back home: frequent involuntary
moves, extended deployments overseas, long separations from
Such
families sometimes with little advance notice.” 65
concerns understandably can distract servicemembers from
the task at hand, not only jeopardizing their own security but
also
potentially impairing the
national
defense. 66
Accordingly, Congress enacted the SCRA “to provide for the
temporary suspension of judicial and administrative
proceedings and transactions that may adversely affect the
civil rights of servicemembers during their military service”
in order “to provide for, strengthen, and expedite the national
defense through protection extended by this Act to
servicemembers of the United States to enable such persons
to devote their entire energy to the defense needs of the
Nation.” 67
But as important as that objective is, the Act was
designed to do even more.
Congress addressed these problems [faced by servicemembers]
adequately and equitably through the Act’s skillfully crafted
balance among the needs of our nation for a strong national
defense, the needs of Servicemembers—and their families—for
security in their personal affairs, and the needs of those who
have dealt with and depend upon Servicemembers for
fulfillment of their obligations. 68

In other words, Congress designed the SCRA not only to
protect servicemembers and their interests, but also to

65. H.R. REP. NO. 108-81, at 51 (2003) (quoting The Servicemembers’ Civil
Relief Act and the Soldiers’ and Sailors’ Civil Relief Act, Hearings on H.R. 5111
and H.R. 4017 Before the Subcomm. on Benefits of the H. Comm. on Veterans’
Affairs, 107th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (2002) (statement of Craig W. Duehring, Acting
Assistant Sec’y of Def., Reserve Affairs, Dep’t of Def. [hereinafter Duehring
Statement]).
66. See, e.g., id. (“Congress also recognized the need to have military men
and women focused on their operational mission free from worry about the
welfare of their families or their personal affairs.”).
67. Servicemembers Civil Relief Act, 50 U.S.C. app. § 502 (2003).
68. H.R. REP. NO. 108-81, at 51 (quoting Duehring Statement, supra note
65, at 3–4, 133).
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protect creditors to whom servicemembers owe obligations. 69
This Part discusses the history and evolution of the balancing
of these interests, following with a discussion of the agencies’
departure from this balancing of interests in Part III.
A. Pre-1918 Moratory Legislation
The SCRA has its roots in moratory legislation from
the Civil War and earlier. Moratory legislation—legislation
staying actions against military servicemembers while those
servicemembers were at war—has a long history. Moratory
legislation was passed by European countries during the
Thirty Years’ War, the war of Spanish succession, the
Napoleonic Wars, and the War of 1870. 70 The first such law
in the United States was passed during the War of 1812. 71 In
December of 1812, with British troops advancing rapidly on
New Orleans and battles raging along the nation’s thenwestern border, the Louisiana legislature implemented a
“stay law” which provided that “ ‘ no civil suit or action shall
be commenced, or prosecuted before any court of record, or
any tribunal of the state, till the first of May next.’ ” 72
During the American Civil War, the legislatures of
several states—both Union and Confederate—passed laws
designed to stay legal actions to which the servicemember
was a party. 73 The U.S. Congress also enacted legislation
69. E.g., THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL’S LEGAL CENTER & SCHOOL, U.S.
ARMY, JA 260, SERVICEMEMBERS CIVIL RELIEF ACT GUIDE § 1-2, at 1-3 (2006)
[hereinafter JAG SCRA GUIDE] (“[The] Act is also designed to protect rights of
individuals having causes of action against persons in the military service.”
(emphasis in original) (citing Ray v. Porter, 464 F.2d 452 (6th Cir. 1972); Ricard
v. Birch, 529 F.2d 214 (4th Cir. 1975))).
70. A. H. Feller, Moratory Legislation: A Comparative Study, 46 HARV. L.
REV. 1061, 1064 (1933); Robert H. Skilton, The Soldiers’ and Sailors’ Civil Relief
Act of 1940 and the Amendments of 1942, 91 U. PA. L. REV. 177, 178–79 (1942)
[hereinafter Skilton, SSCRA]; see also generally Robert H. Skilton, Moratoria
and the Soldiers’ and Sailors’ Civil Relief Act, 227 ANNALS OF THE AM. ACAD. OF
POL. & SOC. SCI. 28 (1943) [hereinafter Skilton, Moratoria].
71. H.R. REP. NO. 108-81, at 32 (2003) (citing the Louisiana law as the first
moratoria statute in the United States).
72. Johnson v. Duncan, 3 Mart. 530, 546 (La. 1815) (quoting the Louisiana
statute). The Johnson court upheld the Louisiana law as a valid exercise of the
State’s police power. Id. at 542, 545. See also Feller, supra note 70, at 1072–73
(discussing the Louisiana stay law and Johnson); H.R. REP. NO. 108-81, at 32
(2003).
73. See Feller, supra note 70, at 1081–85 (detailing state moratoria laws);
Soldiers’ and Sailors’ Civil Relief Bill: Hearings on S. 2859 and H.R. 6361
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automatically suspending statutes of limitation in matters
involving servicemembers. 74
B. The Soldiers’ and Sailors’ Civil Relief Act of 1918
Decades later, in the late stages of World War I,
Congress
again
considered
legislation
to
protect
servicemembers whose military service may impair the
servicemember’s ability to protect his or her interests. At the
time it was discussed, many of the states had already enacted
moratory laws similar to those discussed above. 75 These laws,
like their predecessors, were absolute in character,
preventing legal actions from commencing or progressing
The
against servicemembers during military service. 76
inflexible nature of these laws was deemed unfair by many at
the time of the First World War, since there were many cases
where a servicemember may be in a position to protect his or
her interests—and so the moratorium would provide little
benefit to the servicemember, but substantial hardship to a
servicemember’s creditors. 77
In August of 1917, just weeks after the United States
entered World War I, the Office of the Judge Advocate
General prepared a draft of a bill that would later become the

Before the S. Subcomm. on the Judiciary, 65th Cong. 38 (1917) (discussing state
laws protecting servicemembers); Skilton, SSCRA, supra note 70, at 178
(discussing same); see also WILLIAM M. ROBINSON, JR., JUSTICE IN GREY: A
HISTORY OF THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM OF THE CONFEDERATE STATES OF AMERICA
83–88 (1941). Moratory laws were also enacted subsequent to World War I
during the Great Depression. See, e.g., Skilton, SSCRA, supra note 70, at 178–
79 (“The late depression (and indeed all previous major depressions) produced
many notable examples of governmentally imposed stays upon obligations,
beginning with the Banking Holiday of 1933 and including a variety of
moratoria on mortgage foreclosures.”).
74. Act of June 11, 1864, ch. 118, 13 Stat. 123.
75. Skilton, SSCRA, supra note 70, at 179; see also H.R. REP. NO. 181, at 3
(1917), reprinted in 55 CONG. REC. 7789 (1917) (“In our own Civil War, almost
every State, both North and South, passed some law to give protection against
suit to men in military service. Even now in the present war States have
passed stay laws of one kind or another. State statutes granting exemption to
men in the National Guard are almost universal. The variety of these laws now
and in the Civil War is as wide as the laws are numerous.”). Moratory
legislation had also been passed in Germany, England, and France. Comment,
Moratory Legislation by Congress, 27 YALE L.J. 802, 805 (1918).
76. Skilton, SSCRA, supra note 70, at 179.
77. Id.
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Soldiers’ and Sailors’ Civil Relief Act of 1918 (SSCRA). 78
Assisting the Judge Advocate General were prominent
military lawyers, private-sector lawyers, and academics,
including John H. Wigmore, the author of Wigmore on
Evidence and later Dean of the Northwestern School of Law,
who had been inducted into the military and assigned to the
Judge Advocate General’s Office. 79 Once the bill had been
introduced into the House, the House Committee on the
Judiciary, along with Major/Professor Wigmore and others,
spent ten continuous days working on the draft, eventually
producing a new bill. 80
This new bill reflected the lessons learned from the
unfairness of the Civil War federal legislation and other
absolute moratoria. The Committee’s report recommending
enactment
of
the
SSCRA
explained
that
some
servicemembers would be able to comply with their
obligations and may continue to need unimpeded access to
credit while in military service.
Because an absolute
moratorium may risk creditors reducing servicemembers’
access to credit, the Committee concluded that an absolute
moratorium “is as much mistaken kindness to the soldier as it
is unnecessary.” 81 Yet the Committee acknowledged that
“freedom from harassing debts will make them better and
more effective, more eager soldiers, than if their loyalty and
zeal is tempered with the knowledge that their country,
78. See Mansfield Ferry, Samuel Rosenbaum & John H. Wigmore, The
History of the Soldiers’ and Sailors’ Civil Relief Act (With Explanatory Notes to
the Different Sections and a Discussion of Its Constitutionality), 3 MASS. L. Q.
204, 204 (1918) (discussing the history of the SSCRA legislation).
79. See id.; H.R. REP. NO. 108-81, at 33 (2003). One of the principal
concerns of the Committee was whether such civil relief legislation was
permitted under the Constitution. See, e.g., Ferry, Rosenbaum & Wigmore,
supra note 78 at 215–27 (analyzing the constitutionality of the SSCRA of 1918
and concluding that the Act was constitutional). In 1953, the SSCRA survived a
challenge on constitutionality grounds. In Dameron v. Brodhead, 345 U.S. 322
(1953), the Court held that such legislation is authorized by Congress’ power “to
declare war” and “to raise and support armies.” U.S. CONST. art. I,§ 8, cls. 11–
12.
80. Ferry, Rosenbaum & Wigmore, supra note 78, at 204 (discussing the
process of drafting the bill); 55 CONG. REC. 7788 (1917) (statement of Rep.
Webb) (discussing same); id. at 7793 (statement of Rep. Morgan) (“The authors
of the bill were friends of all those in the military service. They were in full
sympathy with the men in our land and naval forces, and desired to give them
every reasonable protection.”).
81. H.R. REP. NO. 181 (1917), reprinted in 55 CONG. REC. 7789 (1917).
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which demands the supreme sacrifice, grudges a small
measure of protection to their families and their homes.” 82
Recognizing its duties both to servicemembers and to
commercial interests, 83 the Committee and those working
with it produced a bill that sought to balance the needs of
those competing interests. Rather than enacting an absolute
moratorium on civil actions, the Committee recommended
giving discretion to courts regarding whether to stay matters
or take other action to protect the interests of servicemembers
and other parties. 84 Three of those who worked with the
Committee in drafting the legislation explained that the
SSCRA was designed to be a departure from other previous
and then-current approaches. 85 Other approaches, including
moratory legislation, created too broad an exemption from
legitimate obligations since “there are many cases where the
financial ability of soldiers to meet obligations in some way is
not materially impaired by their entrance into service.” 86
Representative Webb, Chair of the House Committee on the
Judiciary, confirmed that the bill that would become the
SSCRA was a departure from previous moratory legislation
which was “arbitrary, inelastic, inflexible.” 87 Rather than
adopt
similarly
inflexible
moratory
legislation,
Representative Webb explained that the bill was intended to
give discretion to courts to achieve “even-handed justice
between the creditor and the soldier,” and to avoid where
possible the disruption of business interests. 88
Thus,
the
Committee
resolved
to
protect
servicemembers in cases where the protection would be
meaningful to the servicemember, while also giving creditors
82. Id.
83. Id. at 7788 (“The committee has felt keenly its duty and responsibility,
not only to the soldiers and sailors but to the commerce of the country, which in
many ways already bears heavy war burdens. It has not failed to appreciate
that a large view of the exigencies of the war requires that any relief that is
given to a soldier shall not be at the expense of industry. The committee fully
realizes the truth of the statement that the war is being fought in this country
as well as on the battle fields of France, and that any drastic measure which
even tended to cripple manufacturing and trade would be prejudicial to the
country’s best interest.”).
84. Ferry, Rosenbaum & Wigmore, supra note 78, at 207.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. 55 CONG. REC. 7787 (1917) (statement of Rep. Webb).
88. Id.
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of servicemembers as much protection as possible under the
circumstances. 89
And to accomplish this balancing of
interests, the Committee elected to grant broad discretion to
the courts to resolve matters equitably and preserve the
status quo where appropriate. 90 This approach was adopted
to provide protections both regarding procedural and
substantive issues. The drafters explained that the bill was
not intended to prevent creditors from exercising legitimate
obligations, but to require them to do so in court. The court
would then have discretion to protect a servicemember’s
interests where the servicemember’s military service
materially affected the servicemember’s ability to do so. 91
On October 4, 1917, the House voted unanimously to
pass the bill. 92 The Senate then considered the bill passed by
the House, 93 and in turn voted unanimously to pass. 94 The
SSCRA of 1918 became law on March 8, 1918. 95 The Act
contained
many
provisions
intended
to
benefit
servicemembers, procedurally and substantively, in matters
related to a servicemember’s financial obligations.
Procedurally, the Act’s protections included (1) protections to
servicemembers against default judgments, requiring
plaintiffs to file an affidavit indicating whether a
servicemember is in military service and permitting the
vacation of judgments against servicemembers in certain
circumstances; 96 (2) requiring courts to stay civil actions or
proceedings in which a servicemember is a party in certain
circumstances; 97 and (3) tolling statutes of limitation during a
servicemember’s period of military service. 98 Substantively,
the SSCRA of 1918 included (1) limitations on eviction of a
89. Skilton, SSCRA, supra note 70, at 180.
90. Id. (“The solution was to throw the entire matter upon the courts, by
giving them discretion to decide upon the grant of moratoria in individual cases,
subject to certain guides defined in the statute. . . . It had both the advantages
and disadvantages of elasticity.”).
91. Ferry, Rosenbaum & Wigmore, supra note 78, at 207–08.
92. Id. at 204.
93. 56 CONG. REC. 1747 (1918) (statement of Sen. Overman) (stating that
the Senate considered the bill as passed by the House).
94. Id. at 1755.
95. Soldiers’ and Sailors’ Civil Relief Act, Pub. L. No. 65-103, 40 Stat. 440
(1918).
96. Id. § 200.
97. Id. § 201.
98. Id. § 205.
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servicemember or a servicemember’s dependents without a
court order; 99 (2) limitations on the repossession of real or
personal property purchased through an installment contract
for purchase, or leased “with a view to purchase such
property,” without a court order, and permitting a court to
stay repossession proceedings in certain circumstances; 100 and
(3) provision that a foreclosure of real or personal property
secured by a mortgage, trust deed, or other security in the
nature of a mortgage is invalid unless pursuant to court
order, and permitting a court to stay foreclosure proceedings
in certain circumstances. 101 In the final Act, the balancing of
servicemember and commercial interests was achieved by
introducing into the Act the concept of “material effect.” This
concept—either in those or related terms—is an essential
element in nearly all of the financial services-related
provisions of the SSCRA of 1918, as well as other
provisions. 102 This concept is discussed in greater detail
below. 103
The drafters’ intent to balance servicemember and
commercial interests is also evidenced by the anti-evasion
provision of the SSCRA of 1918. This provision allowed
courts to take action notwithstanding the provisions of the
SSCRA if “it is made to appear to the satisfaction of the court
that any interest, property, or contract has since the date of
the approval of this Act been transferred or acquired with
intent to delay the just enforcement of such right by taking
advantage of this Act . . . .” 104 The drafters explained that

99. Id. § 300.
100. Soldiers’ and Sailors’ Civil Relief Act, Pub. L. No. 65-103, § 301, 40 Stat.
440, 443–44.
101. Id. § 302.
102. See, e.g., id. §§ 200(4) (permitting vacation of default judgment if, in
part, the person “was prejudiced by reason of his military service.”); 201
(requiring stay unless servicemember “is not materially affected by reason of his
military service.”); 300(2) (permitting stay of eviction proceedings unless court
determines that the ability of tenant to pay rent “is not materially affected by
reason of such military service.”); 301(2) (permitting stay of repossession
proceedings unless court determines that the ability of the servicemember to
comply with the contract “is not materially affected by reason of such service.”);
302(2) (permitting stay of foreclosure proceedings unless court determines that
the ability of the servicemember to comply with the contract “is not materially
affected by reason of his military service.”).
103. See infra Part II.G.
104. Soldiers’ and Sailors’ Civil Relief Act § 600.
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this provision “makes it useless for ingenious debtors to seek
to obtain the benefits of this act by colorable transfers or
assignments to persons who are or may become soldiers or
sailors.” 105 Thus, for example, a business entity could not
avoid enforcement of an obligation by transferring a deed to
one of its officers as the officer is entering military service. 106
By its terms, the Act expired six months after the end of
World War I. 107
C. Soldiers’ and Sailors’ Civil Relief Act of 1940
In 1940, as the United States prepared once again to
enter a world war, the SSCRA was resurrected. 108 The 1940
version of the Act was virtually identical to the 1918
version. 109 As a result, the balancing of interests built into
the 1918 Act remained intact.
When the 1940 Act was first enacted, it was widely
approved. 110 It soon became apparent, however, that the Act
was insufficient to address changed social, military, and
economic circumstances. 111 Among these changes was the
105. Ferry, Rosenbaum & Wigmore, supra note 78, at 213.
106. JAG SCRA GUIDE, supra note 69, § 2-8, at 2-11.
107. Soldiers’ and Sailors’ Civil Relief Act § 603, 40 Stat. at 449 (“[T]his Act
shall remain in force until the termination of the war, and for six months
thereafter . . . .”).
108. Act of Oct. 17, 1940, ch. 888, 54 Stat. 1178. Great Britain similarly
enacted legislation to protect servicemembers during World War II. For a
discussion of this legislation, see generally Rowland Frederick John Sanders,
Wartime Relief from Civil Obligations in Great Britain, 227 ANNALS AM. ACAD.
POL. & SOC. SCI. 62 (1943).
109. See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 108-81, at 33 (2003) (noting that in 1940
“Congress re-enacted the SSCRA almost verbatim.”); Amy J. McDonough,
Gregory M. Huckabee & Christopher C. Gentile, Crisis of the Soldiers’ and
Sailors’ Civil Relief Act: A Call for the Ghost of Major (Professor) John Wigmore,
43 MERCER L. REV. 667, 670 (1992) (noting same); Skilton, SSCRA, supra note
70, at 179. Two of the most significant changes made in the 1940 SSCRA were
the addition of a method for administering insurance protection and protections
with respect to public lands, and an increase of the rent eviction ceiling from
$50 to $80. H.R. REP. NO. 108-81, at 33 (citing Civil Liabilities of Military
Personnel: Hearing on S. 4270 Before the S. Comm. on Military Affairs, 76th
Cong., vol. 2, 18 (1940)).
110. See, e.g., Skilton, SSCRA, supra note 70, at 181.
111. H.R. REP. NO. 108-81, at 33 (2003) (“Within two years [of 1940] it
became apparent that new social and business realities made a major update
necessary.”); McDonough, Huckabee & Gentile, supra note 109, at 670 (noting
same); Skilton, SSCRA, supra note 70, at 181 (“At the time it was passed, it
seemed adequate to meet the needs of men who were expected (by some
Congressmen, at least) to remain in the services for one year of peaceful
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realization that the increased duration of military service
may impose substantial hardship on servicemembers whose
military pay was significantly less than their civilian pay had
been. 112 Additionally, ambiguities in the SSCRA, 113 and
dissatisfaction in how the Act had been interpreted, 114
supplied additional motivation to modify the Act. In response
to these concerns, a team led by Major William Partlow, U.S.
Army, JAGC, prepared amendments to the 1940 Act. 115
These amendments ultimately were passed in 1942. 116
One of the most notable additions proposed by Maj.
Partlow’s team was the creation of an interest rate ceiling.
Under this provision, credit obligations incurred by a
servicemember prior to military service could not accrue
interest at a rate in excess of six percent annually. 117
Consistent with the 1918 Act’s balancing of interests, this
benefit would not apply if the borrower’s ability to pay
training. The actualities of war have destroyed these pleasant illusions. The
army must be held intact, and it must grow. More married men, and older men,
whose financial problems demand a broad and comprehensive program of
moratory relief, are being inducted. The conflict may be protracted; it became
obvious that the short period originally provided for payment by the soldier of
his obligations upon his return from service, would not be enough.”). The
growing dissatisfaction with the SSCRA of 1940 is evidenced by the number of
bills introduced between 1940 and 1942 to amend the Act. See, e.g., Skilton,
SSCRA, supra note 70, at 180 & n.15 (collecting bills).
112. See, e.g., 88 CONG. REC. 5368 (1942) (statement of Rep. Brooks)
(explaining that the bill in part “arises from the differences in pay which a
soldier receives and what the same man normally earns in civil life.”); Gregory
M. Huckabee, Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm: Resurrection of the
Soldiers’ and Sailors’ Civil Relief Act, 132 MIL. L. REV. 141, 146–47 (1991)
(“Differences in pay was a key factor in Congress’s decision to provide special
protection for indebtedness existing prior to call up to active duty.”).
113. Skilton, SSCRA, supra note 70, at 181 (noting ambiguities).
114. THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL’S LEGAL CENTER & SCHOOL, U.S.
ARMY, JA 260, SOLDIERS’ AND SAILORS’ CIVIL RELIEF ACT GUIDE § 1-1, at 1-1
(2000) [hereinafter JAG SSCRA GUIDE] (“In amending the Act [in 1942],
Congress was motivated, in part, by the desire to override court decisions that,
in some instances, had led to restrictive interpretations of the Act.”); see also S.
REP. NO. 1558, at 2 (1942) (“[I]n some instances where there has been doubt as
to whether particular transactions or proceedings are within the scope of the
Civil Relief Act, a new section on language has been added for the purpose of
clarification only and to carry out the original intent of the Congress, but with
no intent to exclude from the provisions of the Act any transaction or proceeding
now included.”).
115. McDonough, et al., supra note 109, at 670.
116. Soldiers’ and Sailors’ Civil Relief Act Amendments of 1942, Pub. L. No.
77-732, 56 Stat. 769.
117. Id. § 206.
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interest on the obligation “is not materially affected by reason
of such [military] service.” 118 The bill also included a new
provision that would allow a court, in cases where the
servicemember had received a stay of a foreclosure or
repossession proceeding, to appoint a three-person panel to
appraise the property and to order an amount “as may be
just” be paid to the servicemember as a condition of
foreclosure or repossession. 119
The 1942 amendments were expressly designed to
continue the balancing of interests established in the 1918
and 1940 Acts. Testifying before Congress regarding the bill
that would become the 1942 amendments, Maj. Partlow
“reaffirmed that the purpose of the Act was ‘toward the
withholding of remedies, rather than the extinguishments of
Recognizing this balancing of interests, one
rights.’ ” 120
commentator at the time observed that the Act did not create
an opportunity for servicemembers to avoid legitimate
obligations; rather, it provides courts with discretion to
provide temporary relief when military service materially
affects a debtor’s ability to comply with obligations. 121 The
amendments were signed into law on October 6, 1942. 122
D. Developments Between 1942 and 2003
In the sixty years following the 1942 amendments, the
balancing of servicemember and commercial interests
118. Id.
119. Id. § 303. The bill included other protections beyond the scope of this
Article, including provisions allowing servicemembers to terminate leases in
circumstances but allowing lessors to apply to a court for relief that “in the
opinion of the court justice and equity may in the circumstances require,” id. §
304, allowing courts to grant servicemembers anticipatory relief relating to a
credit obligation, upon application from the servicemember, unless the court
determines that the servicemember’s ability to comply with the terms of the
obligation “has not been materially affected by reason of his military service,”
id. § 700, and amendments relating to insurance, public lands, and others, id.
arts. IV–V.
120. H.R. REP. NO. 108-81, at 34 (2003) (quoting Soldiers’ and Sailors’ Civil
Relief Act: Hearings on H.R. 7029 Before the H. Comm. on Military Affairs, 77th
Cong. 11 (1942)).
121. M. R. Neifeld, Consumer Credit and the Soldiers’ and Sailors’ Civil
Relief Act, 227 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 43, 45 (1943). Prof. Neifeld
also wrote that the SSCRA was “a social scientist’s dream come true” because it
would give unique insights into issues related to consumer credit, such as the
psychology of credit and credit judgment.
122. Skilton, SSCRA, supra note 70, at 182.
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remained in place as the central concept of the Act. The
SSCRA of 1940, like the SSCRA of 1918, was designed to
expire by its terms. The SSCRA of 1940 was to remain in
force until the later of May 15, 1945, or six months after the
end of World War II. 123 However, in 1948, after the SSCRA
had expired, Congress passed the Military Selective Service
Act, which contained a provision requiring the SSCRA to
remain in force until it was “repealed or otherwise terminated
by a subsequent Act of Congress.” 124
Between 1942 and 2003, the SSCRA was amended
twelve times (excluding the 1942 amendments discussed
above). The amendments were relatively discreet, and in
general were designed to update the Act to a changing
world. 125 For example, to account for rising rents, Congress
raised the rent ceiling in the SSCRA’s eviction protection
from $80 to $150 in 1966, 126 and from $150 to $1,200 in
1991. 127 Additionally, in response to the terrorist attacks of
September 11, 2001, and the large number of National Guard
members called to active duty to protect infrastructure assets,
Congress extended SSCRA protections to National Guard
members called to active duty under 32 U.S.C. § 502(f) for at
least thirty consecutive days. 128 Notwithstanding these and
other updates during these decades, a consensus began to
develop as the twentieth century drew to a close that the

123. Act of Oct. 17, 1940, ch. 888, § 604, 54 Stat. 1178, 1191 (“This Act shall
remain in force until May 15, 1945: [p]rovided, that should the United States be
then engaged in a war, this Act shall remain in force until such war is
terminated by a treaty of peace proclaimed by the President and for six months
thereafter . . . .”) (emphasis in original).
124. Selective Service Act of 1948, Pub. L. No. 758, ch. 625, tit. I, § 14, 62
Stat. 604, 623; see also H.R. REP. NO. 108-81, at 35 (discussing extension of
SSCRA).
125. See Huckabee, supra note 112, 154–57 (discussing the various
amendments); see also H.R. REP. NO. 108-81, at 34–35 (summarizing
amendments).
126. Act of Mar. 7, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-359, ch. 41, § 10, 80 Stat. 26, 28.
127. Soldiers’ and Sailors’ Civil Relief Act Amendments of 1991, Pub. L. No.
102-12, § 2(a), 105 Stat. 34, 34.
128. Veterans Benefits Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-330, tit. III, § 305, 116
Stat. 2820, 2821; see also J. Thomas Parker, Soldiers’ and Sailors’ Civil Relief
Act Now Applicable to the National Guard . . . Sort of, 2003 ARMY LAW. 17, 19
(2003). Curiously, the Department of Defense opposed the provision of SSCRA
benefits to National Guard members. See Duehring Statement, supra note 65,
at 5, 136 (stating that the Department of Defense believed that state law, not
federal, should apply to such duty).
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SSCRA had become out of date. In 1991, three commentators
wrote that “[p]atchwork amendment repairs since 1942 have
proven insufficient to keep the SSCRA in step with the
explosion of modern day technology and societal demands and
obligations. . . . [M]ajor revision of the SSCRA must be
undertaken to repair the armor that time has rusted.” 129
One significant change in the military environment
was the Department of Defense’s (DOD) initiation of the Total
Force Policy. When the Selective Service Act terminated in
1973, effectively ending the draft, the DOD initiated the Total
Force Policy which provided that reserve personnel, rather
than draftees, would serve as the primary source of personnel
to provide “surge” capabilities to the U.S. armed forces to
allow the mobilization of large forces on short notice. 130 In
the following decades, the armed forces shifted more and
more of its combat readiness resources to the reserves as a
fiscal measure. 131 As of 2012, the DOD reported that there
were approximately 1.4 million active duty servicemembers
and 850,000 National Guard and Reserve members. In the
years following implementation of the Total Force Policy, and
especially during the Persian Gulf War in the early 1990s,
this shift from full-time military personnel to reserve
personnel, and the difficulties faced by reservists called to
active duty, raised concerns that the SSCRA did not
adequately address the changing military and social
environment. 132
The consumer credit marketplace had also changed
substantially. Consumer credit products had become more
pervasive and had changed substantially since 1918 and
129. McDonough, Huckabee & Gentile, supra note 109, at 683–84; see also id.
at 671 (“Many provisions that had offered protection to servicemembers seventy
years ago were hopelessly out of date in 1991.”); Soldiers’ and Sailors’ Civil
Relief Act and Veterans’ Reemployment Rights: Joint Hearing Before the Comms.
on Veterans’ Affairs of the H.R. and U.S. Sen., 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1990)
(statement of Rep. Smith) (“Since the Act was written at a time when our
country was very different, both economically and socially, some of the
provisions are fairly dated and perhaps needing revision.”).
130. See, e.g., Role of the Reserves in the Total Force Policy: Hearing Before
the Subcomm. on Readiness of the H. Comm. on Armed Services, at 2–3 (1989)
(statement of Richard A. Davis, Dir., Army Issues, Nat’l Sec. & Int’l Affairs
Div.).
131. See, e.g., id.; McDonough, Huckabee & Gentile, supra note 109, at 668.
132. See, e.g., McDonough, Huckabee & Gentile, supra note 109, at 668;
Huckabee, supra note 112, at 142.
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1942. 133 For example, credit cards as they existed in the late
twentieth century were unknown at the time of the First and
Second World Wars. 134 Thirty-year mortgages were also very
And the extensive leasing of automobiles and
rare. 135
business equipment was a development the drafters of the
original SSCRA could not have imagined. 136 In short, the
drafters of the 1918 Act and the 1942 amendments could not
have foreseen the revolution in consumer financial products
and services that had taken place by the end of the twentieth
century.
Nevertheless, Congress did not make any changes to
the SSCRA during the sixty years after the 1942 amendments
that indicated any intent to depart from the policy of
balancing servicemember and commercial interests first built
into the SSCRA of 1918 and continued in the SSCRA of 1940.
Indeed, shortly before the SSCRA was replaced by the SCRA,
the SSCRA itself had remained very similar to the original
1918 Act. 137 Thus, as of 2002, it was still the view of many
that the Act remained designed to protect both
servicemembers and those to whom servicemembers owed
obligations. For example, Acting Assistant Secretary of
Defense Craig W. Duehring testified before a subcommittee of
the Senate Committee on Veterans’ Affairs that Congress
equitably addressed the challenges faced by servicemembers
through “the Act’s skillfully crafted balance” among the
nation’s need for a strong national defense, the
servicemembers’ interests, and the interests of the
servicemembers’ creditors. 138 And this view was consistent
with decades of court jurisprudence. 139
133. See generally LENDOL CALDER, FINANCING THE AMERICAN DREAM: A
CULTURAL HISTORY OF CONSUMER CREDIT (1999) (discussing the evolution of
consumer credit products and services throughout the twentieth century).
134. Id. at 72, 220, 292–93.
135. Id. at 280–83.
136. H.R. REP. NO. 108-81, at 52 (2003) (quoting Duehring Statement, supra
note 65, at 4, 134).
137. Memorandum from John T. Meixell, Office of the Judge Advocate Gen.,
U.S. Army, Legal Assistance Policy Div., Servicemembers Civil Relief Act
Replaces Soldiers’ and Sailors’ Civil Relief Act 1 (undated), available at
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/legalservices/downloads/
lamp/servicememberscivilreliefact.authcheckdam.pdf.
138. Duehring Statement, supra note 65, at 3, 133, quoted in H.R. REP. NO.
108-81, at 51.
139. See, e.g., JAG SSCRA GUIDE, supra note 114, § 1-5, at 1-5 (“[T]he Act
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E. The Servicemembers Civil Relief Act of 2003
The SCRA continued the decades-old policy of
balancing servicemember and commercial interests. The
2003 legislation was the culmination of efforts dating back to
as early as 1991 to clarify and modernize the SSCRA. 140
Much of the final SCRA reflects a proposed revision of the
SSCRA prepared by the DOD in 1991 and updated in 2002. 141
These proposed revisions had three stated goals: (1) “ ‘ to
make the Act easier to read and understand by clarifying its
language and putting it in modern legislative drafting form;’ ”
(2) “ ‘ to incorporate into the Act many years of judicial
interpretation;’ ” and (3) “ ‘ to update the Act to take into
account generally accepted practice under its provisions and
new developments in American life not envisioned by the
original drafters.’ ” 142 In particular, changes in the financial
products available to and utilized by servicemembers fueled
the perception that a significant update to the Act was
required. 143 As the bill that eventually became the SCRA
moved through the legislative process in 2002 and 2003, these
goals remained. 144
In addition to these goals, the drafters and sponsors of
the bill intended to maintain the balance between
servicemember and commercial interests. 145 The report from
‘may not be employed to enable one who had flouted his obligations in civilian
life to obtain indefinite delay.’ ” (quoting Franklin Soc’y for Home-Building &
Sav. v. Flavin, 40 N.Y.S.2d 582, 583, aff’d, 50 N.E.2d 653, cert. denied, 320 U.S.
786 (1943))); see also Diamond v. United States, 344 F.2d 703 (Ct. Cl. 1965);
Keefe v. Spangenberg, 533 F. Supp. 49 (W.D. Okla. 1981).
140. See, e.g., Gregory M. Huckabee, Congress Does it Again—The Ghost of
Major John Wigmore Returns!, FED. LAW., May 2004, at 22 (describing the 2003
enactment of the SCRA as “a 12-year legislative pilgrimage into law.”).
141. Meixell, supra note 137, at 1.
142. Id. (quoting Memorandum from Colonel Steven T. Strong, Dir., Legal
Policy, Office of the Sec’y of Def. (Pers. & Readiness), to Serv. Legal Assistance
Chiefs (Oct. 3, 2001)).
143. E.g., H.R. REP. NO. 108-81, at 52 (2003).
144. See, e.g., id. at 35 (noting that the bill was intended to clarify and
modernize the SSCRA).
145. See, e.g., id. at 51 (“H.R. 5111 [the bill that formed the basis of the
SCRA of 2003] maintains this important balance [between servicemember and
commercial interests] while addressing three areas where our experience with
the Act indicates that change is needed: clarifying and simplifying the language;
incorporating generally accepted procedures; and updating the Act to reflect 60
years of change in America.” (quoting Duehring Statement, supra note 65, at 4,
134)); Eugene J. Kelly, Jr., John L. Ropiequet & Sharilee Smentek,
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the Senate Committee on Veterans’ Affairs accompanying the
SCRA legislation noted that Congress’s intent with the 2003
legislation was the same as it was in 1940. 146 On the floor of
the House, Rep. Chris Smith of New Jersey, the author of the
House bill, emphasized that “the act is intended to give a
temporary reprieve to a servicemember and that it reflects
the need to be fair to all parties . . . .” 147 In the proposed
legislation, courts would serve the same role they had in the
1918 and 1940 versions of the Act, and the concept of
“material effect” remained in existing protections and was
expanded to new protections. 148 Rather than changing the
purpose of the Act and the balance between interests built
into it, Congress was focused on clarifying and modernizing
the Act. 149 The SCRA became law on December 19, 2003. 150
F. Post-2003 Amendments
In the years since the 2003 enactment of the SCRA,
the Act’s financial protections—and the balancing of interests
built into them—have undergone few changes.
One
significant change was implemented in 2008 by the Housing
and Economic Recovery Act (HERA). 151 HERA extended the
duration of the interest rate benefit for mortgage loans to a

Servicemembers Civil Relief Act of 2003: Old Wine in a New Bottle?, 59
CONSUMER FIN. L. Q. REP. 362, 363 (2005) (discussing same).
146. S. REP. NO. 108-197, at 7 (2003).
147. 149 CONG. REC. H3697 (daily ed. May 7, 2003) (statement of Rep.
Smith).
148. See, e.g., H.R. 100, 108th Cong. §§ 201–02, 204, 207, 301–03, 305, 701
(1st Sess. 2003), reprinted in H.R. REP. NO. 108-81, at 1–21. Much of the bill
considered in the Senate, S. 1136, was “identical to—or at least similar in
substance to—provisions contained in H.R. 100,” so much so that the Senate
committee declined to discuss most of the provisions of S. 1136 because it would
be duplicative of the House report. S. REP. NO. 108-197, at 7–8 (2003).
149. See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 108-81, at 32 (2003) (“[T]he Committee believes
the Soldiers’ and Sailors’ Civil Relief Act (SSCRA) should be restated and
strengthened to ensure that its protections meet their needs in the 21st
century.”).
150. Soldiers’ and Sailors’ Civil Relief Act Amendments of 2003, Pub. L. No.
108-189, 117 Stat. 2835; see also Susan H. Seabury & Jack F. Williams,
Bankruptcy and Debt Under the Servicemembers Civil Relief Act, 2008 ANN.
SURV. BANKR. L. 445 (noting that the differences between the House and Senate
bills were negotiated without need of committee).
151. Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-289, 122
Stat. 2847.
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servicemember’s period of military service plus one year, 152
and the duration of the foreclosure protection after a
servicemember leaves military service from ninety days to
nine months. 153 In 2012, this protection period was further
extended from nine months to one year. 154 Aside from
changing the duration of these protections, HERA did not
otherwise amend the SCRA.
The SCRA was subsequently amended by the
Prior to the
Veterans’ Benefits Act of 2010 (VBA). 155
enactment of the VBA, the SCRA did not expressly provide
private rights of action for servicemembers to enforce SCRA
provisions—although courts had generally held that the
SCRA did provide private rights of action. 156 The VBA
amended the SCRA expressly to permit private rights of
actions. 157 The VBA also amended the SCRA to provide that
the U.S. Attorney General is authorized to enforce the SCRA
and seek civil monetary penalties of up to $55,000 for a first
violation of the Act, and penalties of up to $110,000 for
subsequent violations. 158
These post-2003 amendments left the provisions that
balanced the interests of servicemembers and commercial
interests intact. To date, the SCRA retains the interestbalancing structure that was originally implemented in the
1918 Act.

152. Id. § 2203(b).
153. Id. § 2203(a). HERA also provided that this protection would sunset on
Dec. 31, 2010. Id. § 2203(c). On Dec. 29, 2010, the expiration date was
extended until Dec. 31, 2012. Helping Heroes Keep Their Homes Act of 2010,
Pub. L. No. 111-346, § 2, 124 Stat. 3622, 3622.
154. Honoring America’s Veterans and Caring for Camp Lejeune Families
Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-154, § 710(a), 126 Stat. 1165, 1208. Unless
otherwise amended, this extension of time is set to expire on Dec. 31, 2014. Id.
§ 710(d).
155. Veterans Benefits Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-275, 124 Stat. 2864.
156. See, e.g., Lt. Col. Conrad, Federal Court Rules that Military Members
Have a Private Cause of Action Under the Soldiers’ and Sailors’ Civil Relief Act,
ARMY LAW, July 1998, at 63.
157. Veterans Benefits Act § 303(a); H.R. REP. NO. 111-324, at 17 (2009).
158. Veterans Benefits Act § 303(a); H.R. REP. NO. 111-324, at 17.
Additionally, the VBA amended the lease provisions of the SCRA to prohibit
early termination charges. Veterans Benefits Act § 301; see also H.R. REP. NO.
111-324, at 17.
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G. The Central Concept: Material Effect
The concept of “material effect” is the central equitable
concept in the SCRA, and the primary means by which the
balancing of servicemember and commercial interests is
achieved. 159 This concept has been the principal component of
the balancing of interests since the first SSCRA was enacted
in 1918. It was designed to ensure that the protections and
benefits of the SSCRA would apply only when the
servicemember was geographically or economically prejudiced
by military service. For example, Major/Professor John
Wigmore explained that the “material effect” standard was
not intended to protect those whose noncompliance with
credit obligations was unrelated to military service; instead,
“[w]e have tried to hitch up those provisions so that no relief
shall be given to any person in the military service, unless he
needs the relief, just because he is in military service.” 160 In
other words, “material effect” is limited to difficulties caused
by military service, not merely difficulties experienced while
in military service. Or, to use a sports metaphor, the SCRA
“does not excuse a servicemember from his/her obligations,
but it will level the playing field so that military personnel
are not disadvantaged because of their commitment to our
nation.” 161
With respect to the financial protections, the concept
of material effect is generally raised in two, sometimes
interconnected, ways: geographic prejudice (i.e., military
service impairs the servicemember’s ability to protect his or
her rights because of where the servicemember is stationed);
and economic prejudice (i.e., military service, including the
possibility of reduced income, impairs the servicemember’s
Thus, a
ability to meet financial obligations). 162
servicemember serving overseas who is sued in the United
States likely is materially affected in his or her ability to
defend the case; but a servicemember serving in the
continental United States who is sued in a court located just
159. See, e.g., Kathleen H. Switzer, Mortgage Defaults and the Soldiers’ and
Sailors’ Civil Relief Act: Assigning the Burden of Proof When Applying the
Material Effect Test, 18 REAL ESTATE L.J., 171, 173–74 (1989).
160. Soldiers’ and Sailors’ Civil Relief Bill: Hearing on S. 2859 and H.R.
6361 Before the S. Subcomm. on the Judiciary, 65th Cong. 217 (1917).
161. JAG SCRA GUIDE, supra note 69, § 1-2, at 1-3.
162. Id. § 3-3, at 3-8 to -9.
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minutes from the base where he or she is serving likely would
not be. 163 Similarly, a physician who is called to military
service and whose income is dramatically reduced as a result
may be materially affected in his or her ability to comply with
a credit obligation; but a person who is unemployed and then
called into military service may not be. 164
To best serve the balancing of interests between
parties, the Supreme Court has held that courts must be
flexible in applying the material effect test. 165 In particular,
the Court declined to specify which party has the burden to
establish material effect, concluding that courts should have
discretion to allocate the burden on a case-by-case basis. 166
Thus, in many cases, the burden may fall on the
servicemember to prove material effect, rather than on a
creditor to disprove it. 167 Prior to the enactment of the SCRA
in 2003, some urged Congress to further define “material
effect.” 168 The final Act did not contain such a definition,
however.
The House Committee on Veterans’ Affairs
explained that this was because the Committee concluded
that “courts, in considering the facts and circumstances of
163. Id. § 3-3, at 3-8 to -9 (noting that military service often may have no
more impact on a servicemember’s ability to protect his or her rights than would
any other pursuit, and that “[l]ike any other citizen, the servicemember may
have to work through an attorney.”); see also Cornell Leasing Corp. v.
Hemmingway, 553 N.Y.S.2d 285 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1990) (finding that defendant
failed to show prejudice where servicemember lived in vicinity of court and
status as reserve or active duty military was unclear); Burgess v. Burgess, 234
N.Y.S.2d 87 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1962). In this case, the servicemember was stationed
where “he was always accessible to the court” and had been “fully informed of
the pendency of the action.” Id. at 89. The court concluded he was not
materially affected by reason of his military service in his ability to participate
in the action.
164. See, e.g., Creamer v. Ansoplano, 52 N.Y.S.2d 862 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1945)
(noting that a pattern of compliance begun before the debtor’s induction into
military service supports the conclusion that military service did not materially
affect the debtor’s ability to comply with the obligation). But see Fourte v.
Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., No. 07-cv-1363, 2009 WL 2998110, at *3–4
(D.N.J. Sept. 15, 2009) (holding that mere potential of increased civilian income
supported finding of material effect even though military income was higher
than actual civilian income).
165. Boone v. Lightner, 319 U.S. 561, 569 (1943).
166. Id.
167. Some have argued that the burden of proof should never be on the
servicemember. See, e.g., Lanourra L. Phillips, The Servicemembers Civil
“______” Act: Giving the Act the “Relief” It Deserves, 34 U. DAYTON L. REV. 103
(2008).
168. H.R. REP. NO. 108-81, at 36 (2003).
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specific cases, have generally interpreted the term in ways
that are consistent with the intent of the Act as Major
Wigmore explained it.” 169
III.

THE SCRA AND AGGRESSIVE ENFORCEMENT

Notwithstanding the abundant evidence in the
structure and history of the SCRA and its predecessors
regarding the central role the balancing of servicemember
and creditor interests plays in the statutory scheme, recent
government enforcement actions have given short shrift to
this balancing of interests. Instead, government agencies
have focused exclusively on short-term benefits to
servicemembers, without apparent regard to the costs to, and
burdens on, creditors or to potential long-term costs to
servicemembers. And acting with this focus, the agencies
have aggressively expanded their interpretation of the SCRA
in ways that are not only inconsistent with the purpose and
structure of the SCRA, but also in several cases inconsistent
with the statutory text. And in at least some cases, the
agencies acknowledged that the remedies provided under the
settlements exceeded the requirements of the SCRA itself. 170
As one may expect from a retroactive application of newlyexpanded interpretations of a statute, these enforcement
actions have resulted in hundreds of millions of dollars in
remediation and penalties.
Thus, the government agencies’ conduct in these
enforcement actions is consistent with the bureaucratic
tendencies discussed in Part I above. This part will examine
in more detail the positions taken by the government agencies
in their SCRA enforcement actions, illustrating how the
agencies’ conduct is consistent with the observations of
regulatory theory. In particular, this part will focus on
several of the agencies’ positions that constitute significant
expansions of the standards established by the SCRA. First,
it will discuss the agencies’ adoption of a strict liability theory
169. Id.
170. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, $25 Billion Mortgage Servicing
Agreement Filed in Federal Court (Mar. 12, 2012) (“The consent judgments
provide enhanced protections for service members that go beyond those required
by the Servicemembers Civil Relief Act (SCRA).”), available at
https://d9klfgibkcquc.cloudfront.net/Settlement-USDOJ-FILING-newsrelease.pdf.
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for alleged SCRA violations, and examine the flaws in the
reasoning supporting this position. It will then discuss
specific positions on two central SCRA protections—the
protection regarding default judgments and the interest rate
cap—and show how the agencies’ positions are departures
from the text and purpose of the Act. Finally, it will discuss
how the agencies’ positions are incompatible with the rule of
lenity, which applies to the SCRA as it does to other hybrid
civil-criminal statutes.
A. Strict Liability: A New Standard
Perhaps the agencies’ most dramatic departure from
the SCRA’s purpose and structure—and the starkest example
of the tendency to adopt expansive interpretations of the
law—is the imposition of civil liability for alleged SCRA
violations on a strict liability theory. The adoption of strict
liability under the SCRA first occurred not in an agency
enforcement action, but in a civil action brought by the
Department of Justice against a towing company. In United
States v. B.C. Enterprises, Inc., 171 the DOJ brought a civil
action against three defendants alleging that the sale of
twenty vehicles owned by active-duty servicemembers at
auction violated the SCRA’s protection against the
enforcement of storage liens without court orders. 172 The
defendants argued that they exercised due diligence in
enforcing their storage liens and therefore could not be liable,
whereas the DOJ argued that the applicable standard is strict
liability. 173 The court, recognizing this was a case of first
impression, ruled against the defendants and held that strict
liability is the standard. 174 The court reasoned that the
language in the SCRA’s storage lien provision closely
resembled language in other strict liability statutes. 175 The
court also looked to dicta from a then-recent case, as well as a
1918 case construing the SSCRA, and concluded that those
cases further supported the strict liability view. 176 Noting
that the SCRA’s interest rate cap required the servicemember
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.

United States v. B.C. Enters., Inc., 667 F. Supp. 2d 650 (E.D. Va. 2009).
Id. at 653.
Id. at 662.
Id. at 662–63.
Id. at 662.
Id. at 662–63.
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to provide written notice and a copy of military orders to be
eligible for the protection, and that the storage lien provision
contained no such requirement, the court concluded that
strict liability was supported by the structure of the SCRA. 177
Finally, the court rejected the defendant’s factual evidence
that it is not possible to verify accurately a vehicle owner’s
military status. 178 While the court acknowledged that “the
inadvertent sale of servicemembers’ vehicles may occasionally
be unavoidable,” the court concluded that the defendant could
simply obtain a court order in every case before selling a
vehicle. 179 Thus, the court concluded, “even if the Defendants
exercised the utmost care in investigating their victims’
military status, they face liability for their actions.” 180
The B.C. Enterprises decision has formed the basis for
the position taken by the DOJ, the federal banking agencies,
and the state attorneys general that the SCRA is a strict
liability statute 181—and is therefore worthy of further
examination. Ultimately, the agencies’ reliance on B.C.
Enterprises is misplaced. 182 First, the question of whether the
SCRA is a strict liability statute itself reflects a
misunderstanding of the SCRA’s (and SSCRA’s) scheme of
balancing servicemember and creditor interests. The Act was
177. United States v. B.C. Enters., Inc., 667 F. Supp. 2d 650, 663 (E.D. Va.
2009).
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 663–64.
181. Statement of Amber Standridge, Trial Attorney, U.S. Dep’t of Justice,
Servicemembers Civil Relief Act, Women in Housing and Finance Brown Bag
Lunch (June 8, 2011) (stating that B.C. Enterprises provides the basis for the
DOJ’s determination that the SCRA is a strict liability statute); In the author’s
experience in representing many clients in numerous SCRA reviews conducted
by independent consultants (“ICs”) required by various SCRA-related consent
orders, the ICs have reported receiving this guidance from enforcement
agencies. To the author’s knowledge, this guidance has not previously been
made public by any of the enforcement agencies. This Article references this
informal and non-public guidance to the ICs as “IC Guidance” hereinafter.
182. Following B.C. Enterprises, courts are split regarding whether the
SCRA’s provisions support a strict liability theory. Roberts v. Chips Express,
Inc., No. 12-cv-42-JPS, 2012 WL 4866495, at *3–5 (E.D. Wis. Oct. 12, 2012)
(finding strict liability); Gordon v. Pete’s Auto Serv., 837 F. Supp. 2d 581, 585
(E.D. Va. 2011) (finding same); but see Frazier v. HSBC Mortg. Servs., Inc., No.
8:08-cv-02396–T–24-TGW, 2009 WL 4015574, at *6 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 19, 2009)
(holding that the SCRA does not impose strict liability on a servicemember who
inadvertently overcharges a servicemember under the interest rate cap but then
corrects the error).
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not designed to create liability except in cases where a
creditor acted knowingly in a manner inconsistent with the
Act’s protections. 183 Instead, the Act was designed to preserve
the status quo while a servicemember was in military service
unless a court found that military service did not materially
affect the servicemember’s ability to protect his or her
interests. 184 The imposition of civil liability in cases where a
creditor had no knowledge, constructive or otherwise, of a
servicemember’s eligibility for protection is fundamentally
inconsistent with the SCRA’s structure and purpose.
Reliance on B.C. Enterprises is further misplaced
because of the many flaws in the court’s reasoning. For
example, the B.C. Enterprises court relied on the 1918 case of
Hoffman v. Charlestown Five Cent Sav. Bank, 185 which
analyzed the SSCRA’s provision providing foreclosure
protection. The Hoffman court was asked to provide relief for
(i.e., to unwind) a foreclosure, not to impose civil liability. 186
The defendant in Hoffman argued that it did not know or
have any reason to know that an owner of the property was in
military service (and, indeed, the servicemember held
equitable title only), and therefore the foreclosure was
valid. 187 The court rejected this argument, concluding that
when the SSCRA said that “[n]o sale under a power of
sale . . . shall be valid if made during the period of military
service” except upon court order, that applied in all cases
even if the bank had no notice. 188 The court concluded that

183. See, e.g., Servicemembers Civil Relief Act, 50 U.S.C. app. § 531(c) (2003)
(providing for criminal liability if a person “knowingly” evicts or attempts to
evict a person inconsistent with the sections protections); id. § 532(b)
(discussing same regarding foreclosures).
184. See, e.g., id. § 502(2) (“The purposes of this Act are— . . . to provide for
the temporary suspension of judicial and administrative proceedings and
transactions that may adversely affect the civil rights of servicemembers during
their military service.”); see also supra notes 81–91 and accompanying text; L.
Sue Hayn, Soldiers’ and Sailors’ Civil Relief Act Update, 1989 ARMY LAW. 40, 40
(1989) (“Congress attempted to preserve the status quo during the conflict by
permitting the service member to delay these actions until circumstances
allowed the service member to return to defend endangered interests.”).
185. Hoffman v. Charlestown Five Cents Sav. Bank, 121 N.E. 15 (Mass.
1918).
186. Id. at 16.
187. Id.
188. Id. (citing Soldiers’ and Sailors’ Civil Relief Act, Pub. L. No. 65-103, §
302(3), 40 Stat. 440, 444 (1918)).
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since the owner of the property was in military service, and
since the foreclosure had been effected without court order,
the foreclosure was not valid and granted relief to the
servicemember. 189 In other words, and consistent with the
SSCRA’s structure and balancing of interests, the court
returned the parties to the status quo ex ante. Hoffman
supports the proposition that a court can return the parties to
the positions they were in prior to the servicemember’s
military service even if the creditor was unaware of that
military service; but it does not support the proposition that
liability may be imposed on a creditor who acts without such
knowledge.
The B.C. Enterprises holding is further flawed because
the court misunderstood the structure of the SCRA. The
court noted that the SCRA requires a servicemember to
submit written notice and a copy of military orders to a
creditor to become eligible for the interest rate cap. 190 The
court reasoned that the absence of such a requirement in the
storage lien protection suggested Congress intended that the
protection apply even if the servicemember did not notify the
lienholder. 191 This reasoning overlooks the purpose of the
requirement for notice and a copy of military orders in the
interest rate cap provision. The interest rate cap limits the
rate of interest on certain credit obligations during a
servicemember’s period of military service. 192 The benefit can
be requested retroactively back to the date the servicemember
first became eligible, up until 180 days after the
servicemember leaves military service. 193 But for a creditor to
apply the benefit retroactively, the creditor must know when
the servicemember’s military service started. Prior to the
2003 enactment of the SCRA, the SSCRA did not provide
guidance regarding how a servicemember should request the
SCRA benefit. 194 During congressional hearings in 1990,
witnesses informed the House and Senate Committees on
Veterans’ Affairs that creditors were generally requesting a
189. Id. at 16–17.
190. United States v. B.C. Enters., Inc., 667 F. Supp. 2d 650, 663 (E.D. Va.
2009) (citing Servicemembers Civil Relief Act, 50 U.S.C. app. § 527(b)(1) (2006)).
191. Id.
192. Servicemembers Civil Relief Act § 527(a)(1).
193. Id. § 527(b)(1).
194. Id. § 526; H.R. REP. NO. 108-81, at 39 (2003).
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written statement requesting the benefit and a copy of the
orders calling the servicemember to military service which
showed when military service commenced. 195 In its 2003
report explaining the bill that eventually became the SCRA,
the House Committee on Veterans Affairs clarified that the
bill would modify the interest rate cap provision to codify the
The
practices discussed during the 1990 hearings. 196
Committee explained that this requirement to submit orders
was designed to show when a servicemember begins military
service—information essential for proper implementation of
the interest rate cap. 197 Since this requirement is designed to
provide creditors with information about the period of time a
servicemember was in military service—information relevant
to the interest rate protection, but less relevant to other
protections—it is not surprising that other SCRA provisions
would not include such requirements. And accordingly, the
absence of such a requirement in other provisions does not
support a conclusion that those other provisions provide for
strict liability.
Reliance on B.C. Enterprises is also misplaced because
the court erred in concluding that hardship to creditors is not
relevant to a determination of whether a provision imposes
strict liability. 198 A statutory interpretation that renders
compliance impossible is precisely the type of absurd result
courts should avoid. 199 In many cases, it is impossible for a
creditor to determine if a borrower or lessee is a
servicemember. Even though the Department of Defense has
created a website that allows creditors with certain
information to determine whether a person is in military

195. See, e.g., Soldiers’ and Sailors’ Civil Relief Act and Veterans’
Reemployment Rights: Joint Hearing Before the Comms. on Veterans’ Affairs of
the H.R. and U.S. Sen., supra note 129, at 186–87 (statement of Thomas J.
Hughes, President and Chief Exec. Officer, Navy Fed. Credit Union).
196. H.R. REP. NO. 108-81, at 39 (“Section 207 would codify the practices
established during the Persian Gulf War.”).
197. Id. at 39 (“These orders indicate the period of time for which the
servicemember is called to duty.”).
198. See supra notes 173–84 and accompanying text.
199. See, e.g., In re Fed.-Mogul Global, Inc., 684 F.3d 355, 370 (3d Cir. 2012)
(rejecting interpretation as “absurd” where compliance with that interpretation
would be impossible in some instances); Alt. Aviation Servs. Inc. v. Meggitt
(UK) Ltd., 207 F. App’x 506, 513 (6th Cir. 2006) (same); Sandler ex rel. Sandler
v. Hickey, 5 F. App’x 233, 236 (4th Cir. 2001) (same).
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service, 200 there are many people who might be eligible for
SCRA protection that either would not appear in the database
or for whom a creditor/lessor would not have the necessary
information to perform the search. For example, the SCRA’s
eviction protection applies to dependents as well as to
servicemembers. 201 But there is no database available to
creditors or lessors providing information about whether a
particular individual is the dependent of a servicemember.
Additionally, the SCRA extends benefits to U.S. citizens
serving in the armed forces of an allied nation. 202 There is at
present no database available to creditors or lessors that
would provide information on people serving in this capacity.
Adopting a strict liability interpretation of such provisions
would place creditors and lessors in a position where
compliance would be impossible unless the servicemember
notified the creditor of his or her military service.
The B.C. Enterprises court’s response to the argument
about impossibility of compliance is similarly flawed. The
court stated that compliance with the SCRA’s storage lien
protection could be achieved simply by conducting all auction
sales pursuant to court order. 203 But such an interpretation
would have the effect of reading the SCRA to preempt all
laws permitting lien holders to exercise their liens without
obtaining a court order. There is no authority to support the
position that Congress intended the SCRA or its predecessors
to preempt or otherwise invalidate all laws that allow
lienholders, secured parties, or landlords from availing
themselves of laws permitting them to exercise their rights
outside of court. And without such authority, the court’s
interpretation is inconsistent with the interpretive canon that
courts should avoid interpreting a statute so as to implicitly
preempt other laws. 204
Finally, whatever merit the B.C. Enterprises court’s
analysis of the text of the storage lien protection may have,
that analysis is inapplicable to other SCRA provisions. The
200. See infra notes 252–267 and accompanying text.
201. Servicemembers Civil Relief Act, 50 U.S.C. app. § 531 (2012).
202. Id. § 514.
203. See supra note 179 and accompanying text.
204. See, e.g., Zimmerman v. Norfolk S. Corp., 706 F.3d 170, 176 (3d Cir.
2013) (“We tend to interpret federal statutes in a way that avoids implied
preemption.”).
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B.C. Enterprises court focused on the language in the storage
lien provision prohibiting the enforcement of a storage lien
without court order, 205 and concluded that this language
sufficiently resembled other strict liability statutes to support
a conclusion that the SCRA’s storage lien protection imposed
strict liability. 206 But many other provisions in the SCRA are
not phrased in terms of a prohibition as is the storage lien
provision; instead, they simply provide that the action taken
is invalid. For example, the SCRA’s foreclosure protection
does not provide that a creditor “may not” foreclose on a
mortgage because of default, but provides that a foreclosure
“shall not be valid” if made during the servicemember’s period
of eligibility. 207 The text of the foreclosure protection does not
establish a prohibition that can be violated; rather, it
provides that a foreclosure that is not pursuant to a court
order or written waiver is not valid. In other words,
consistent with the SCRA’s balancing of interests, it returns
the parties to the status quo ex ante. This confusion appears
to have been exacerbated by the 2010 amendment to the
statute authorizing the Attorney General and private
plaintiffs to bring civil actions for “violations” of the Act. 208 It
is axiomatic that a “violation” can exist only where a
requirement or prohibition exists to be violated. 209 In statutes
that do not contain requirements or prohibitions—as is the
case in many SCRA provisions—there is simply no provision
to violate. Where a provision of the Act is designed to return
parties to the status quo ex ante, the remedy is a return to
that position—not the imposition of civil penalties under a
strict liability theory. But as discussed above, the imposition
of civil penalties is consistent with regulatory theory’s
observations regarding an agency’s incentives to seek large
financial remedies.

205. Servicemembers Civil Relief Act § 537(a)(1) (“A person holding a lien on
the property or effects of a servicemember may not . . . foreclose or enforce any
lien on such property or effects without a court order . . . .”).
206. United States v. B.C. Enters., Inc., 667 F. Supp. 2d 650, 662 (E.D. Va.
2009) (citing Md. Dep’t of Natural Res. v. Kellum, 51 F.3d 1220, 1225 (4th Cir.
1995)).
207. Servicemembers Civil Relief Act, 50 U.S.C. app. § 533(c) (2012).
208. Id. §§ 597–597a; see also supra notes 155–58 and accompanying text.
209. See, e.g., BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1705 (9th ed. 2009) (defining
“violation” as including “the contravention of a right or duty.”).
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B. Strict Liability in Government Enforcement
Notwithstanding the flaws in the B.C. Enterprises
decision and its inconsistencies with the SCRA’s purpose and
structure (as well as its limitation to storage liens), the DOJ,
the federal banking agencies, and the state attorneys general
have settled over twenty enforcement actions and imposed
hundreds of millions of dollars in civil liability since 2011
under the SCRA’s foreclosure and repossession protections
applying the strict liability theory first articulated in B.C.
Enterprises. This approach is inconsistent with the historical
understanding of the statute, 210 as well as the statutory text
and the balancing of interests built into the Act. To be
consistent with the statutory text and structure, a violation
should be found only where a person acts contrary to an
express requirement or prohibition. But while inconsistent
with the statutory text and structure, this expansion of
liability is consistent with the bureaucratic tendencies toward
maximizing financial recovery, expanding the reach of the
statutes the agencies administer, and agency tunnel vision.
The strict liability theory was first applied in SCRA
enforcement actions against financial institutions in 2011. 211
In April of that year, the federal banking agencies entered
into settlements with fourteen federally-regulated mortgage
These settlements addressed a range of
servicers. 212
210. See, e.g., Kathleen H. Switzer, Benefits for Reserve and National Guard
Members Under the Soldiers’ and Sailors’ Civil Relief Act of 1940, 110 BANKING
L.J. 517, 526 (1993) (“Regardless of the type of relief that is available, borrowers
have an obligation to notify their banks that they are on active duty. Thus,
banks have no duty to seek out those who might be eligible for relief but should
be prepared to handle requests for relief and inquiries regarding the SSCRA.”).
211. The DOJ resolved an enforcement action in 2008 against Homecomings
Financial, LLC. That case involved a prepayment penalty against a single
servicemember, which Homecomings ultimately agreed to waive. The strict
liability issue was not raised. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, The Justice
Department Resolves Investigation Under Servicemembers Civil Relief Act of
Homecomings
Financial,
LLC
(Dec.
15,
2008),
available
at
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2008/December/08-crt-1108.html.
212. Press Release, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Federal
Reserve issues enforcement actions related to deficient practices in residential
mortgage
loan
servicing
(Apr.
13,
2011),
available
at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/enforcement/20110413a.htm;
Press Release, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, U.S. Dep’t of the
Treasury, OCC Takes Enforcement Action Against Eight Servicers for Unsafe
and Unsound Foreclosure Practices (Apr. 13, 2011), available at
http://www.occ.gov/news-issuances/news-releases/2011/nr-occ-2011-47.html;
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foreclosure-related practices, including allegations of SCRA
violations. 213
To identify the alleged foreclosure-related
violations, the settlements required the mortgage servicers to
engage independent consultants (ICs) to conduct a
comprehensive foreclosure review process known as the
Independent Foreclosure Review (IFR). 214 As part of the IFR,
the ICs were required to review loans for SCRA compliance. 215
And in guidance provided by the federal banking agencies to
the ICs, the agencies instructed the ICs that the SCRA is a
strict liability statute and has no safe harbors. 216 The federal
banking agencies subsequently agreed to terminate the IFR
in exchange for compensation and other relief to borrowers
totaling $9.3 billion. 217
This strict liability theory was applied one month later
in another two foreclosure-related settlements: one between
the Department of Justice and Countrywide (through its
successor-in-interest), and the other between the DOJ and
Saxon Mortgage Servicing. 218 These settlements involved
allegations that the servicers had foreclosed on SCRA-eligible
borrowers without a court order or written waiver from the
servicemembers. In the complaints, the DOJ alleged that the
servicers “had actual or constructive notice of the military
Press Release, Office of Thrift Supervision, OTS 11-008, OTS Takes Action to
Correct
Foreclosure
Deficiencies
(Apr.
13,
2011),
available
at
http://www.occ.gov/static/news-issuances/ots/press-releases/ots-pr-2011-08.pdf.
213. Federal Reserve System, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency &
Office of Thrift Supervision, Interagency Review of Foreclosure Policies and
Practices, at 3, 7, 11 (Apr. 2011), available at http://www.occ.gov/newsissuances/news-releases/2011/nr-occ-2011-47a.pdf.
214. E.g., Consent Order at art. VII, In re Citibank, N.A., No. AA-EC-11-13
(Comptroller of the Currency, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury 2011). The IFR was
subsequently the source of substantial public criticism. See, e.g., U.S. GOV’T
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-13-550T, FORECLOSURE REVIEW, LESSONS
LEARNED COULD ENHANCE CONTINUING REVIEWS AND ACTIVITIES UNDER
AMENDED CONSENT ORDERS: TESTIMONY BEFORE THE SUBCOMM. ON HOUS.,
TRANSP., AND CMTY. DEV., COMM. ON BANKING, HOUS., AND URBAN AFFAIRS,
U.S. S. (2013) (statement of Lawrance L. Evans, Jr., Director, Fin. Mkts. and
Cmty. Inv.) (criticizing the IFR process and oversight).
215. E.g, Citibank, N.A., supra note 214, art. VII, ¶ 3(b) (requiring the
servicer to determine whether each foreclosure was in accordance with
applicable law “including but not limited to SCRA.”).
216. IC Guidance, supra note 181
217. Press Release, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., supra note 29.
218. Press Release, Office of Pub. Affairs, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Justice
Department Settles with Bank of America and Saxon Mortgage for Illegally
Foreclosing on Servicemembers (May 26, 2011).
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service” of many of the servicemembers—indicating that the
servicers had no notice of military service, either actual or
constructive, in many other cases and that liability was being
The parties
imposed under a strict liability theory. 219
collectively agreed to settle the allegations for a total of over
$61 million. 220
The application of strict liability was continued with
the SCRA allegations that were part of the National
Mortgage Settlement (NMS) between the nation’s five largest
mortgage servicers and the DOJ and forty-nine state
attorneys general (AGs). 221 Among the various foreclosurerelated allegations in the NMS, the DOJ and state AGs also
alleged a variety of SCRA violations. 222 These allegations
show that the DOJ and state AGs continued the application of
the strict liability theory. For example, the complaint alleges
that the mortgage servicers “failed to determine consistently
and accurately the military status of borrowers in
foreclosure.” 223 In other words, in many cases the agencies
acknowledged that the mortgage servicers were not aware of
the borrower’s military service and, therefore, of the
borrower’s potential SCRA eligibility.
Shortly after the NMS, the DOJ and the Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) announced they had

219. Compl. ¶ 7, United States v. BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP, No. 11-cv04534 (C.D. Cal. May 26, 2011). The Saxon complaint was more specific,
alleging only that Saxon “had actual or constructive notice of the military
service of at least ten of the seventeen servicemembers”—indicating that Saxon
had no notice, either actual or constructive, of military service for as many as
40% of the borrowers. Compl. ¶ 7, United States v. Saxon Mortg. Servs., Inc.,
No. 3:11-cv-01111-F (N.D. Tex. May 26, 2011).
220. Consent Order ¶ 18, BAC Home Loans Servicing, No. 11-cv-04534 (C.D.
Cal. May 31, 2011); Consent Order ¶ 17, Saxon Mortg. Servs., Inc., No. 3:11-cv01111-F (N.D. Tex. May 26, 2011). Subsequently, the DOJ announced an
additional $39 million in payments under these consent orders. Press Release,
U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Service Members to Receive $39 Million for Violations of
the Servicemembers Civil Relief Act (Apr. 4, 2013), available at
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2013/April/13-crt-383.html.
221. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, supra note 170.
222. Compl. ¶¶ 97–101, United States v. Bank of Am. Corp., No. 1:12-cv00361 (D.D.C. Mar. 12, 2012) (alleging various SCRA violations); Consent
Judgment, supra note 40, ¶ 11, Ex. A at 32–35, Ex. H at 2, 8, 10–11 (imposing
various requirements regarding SCRA issues and requiring extensive review of
files for SCRA issues).
223. Compl., supra note 222, ¶ 97.
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entered into settlements with Capital One. 224
Unlike
previous settlements, this settlement was not limited to
foreclosure-related issues but also included allegations
related to auto lending and the application of the SCRA’s
interest rate benefit to various types of credit products. 225
With the exception of the interest rate protection, which the
DOJ and the OCC acknowledged required the servicemember
to submit written notice and a copy of military orders to
qualify, the other protections were again enforced under a
strict liability theory. 226 The DOJ’s press release announced
that the settlement would be for approximately $12 million, 227
but the settlement agreements required compensation to
borrowers based on a formula applied to the results of the file
review. 228
In September 2013, the OCC announced a settlement
with three banks regarding SCRA benefits and protections.229
The settlement resolved allegations that the banks failed to
comply with the SCRA’s interest rate cap and with various
other SCRA protections, including the default judgment
protection, in the banks’ collections activities. 230 Again, the
OCC took the position that the SCRA is a strict liability
statute. 231 The settlement required the bank to provide an
undisclosed amount of compensation to affected consumers. 232

224. Press Release, Office of Pub. Affairs, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Justice
Department Reaches $12 Million Settlement to Resolve Violations of the
Servicemembers Civil Relief Act by Capital One (July 26, 2012), available at
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2012/July/12-ag-933.html; Press Release, Office of
the Comptroller of the Currency, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, OCC Takes Actions
Against Capital One to Assure Servicemembers Receive Credit Protections for
Their Mortgages and Other Loans (July 26, 2012), available at
http://www.occ.gov/news-issuances/news-releases/2012/nr-occ-2012-115.html.
225. Consent Order ¶ 1, United States v. Capital One, N.A., No. 1:12-cv00828 (E.D. Va. July 27, 2012).
226. Id.
227. See supra note 224.
228. Consent Order, supra note 220, ¶¶ 36–51.
229. Press Release, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, U.S. Dep’t of
the Treasury, OCC Takes Action Against JPMC to Protect Consumers and to
Ensure Servicemembers Receive Credit Protections for Their Non-Home Loans
(Sept. 19, 2013), available at http://www.occ.gov/news-issuances/newsreleases/2013/nr-occ-2013-139.html.
230. Consent Order, In re JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., No. AA-EC-13-76
(Comptroller of the Currency, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury 2013).
231. Id. at art. I, ¶ 1(f).
232. Id.
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Most recently, the DOJ and FDIC announced
settlements with Sallie Mae regarding the SCRA’s interest
The
rate benefit and default judgment protections. 233
settlement resolved allegations that Sallie Mae failed to
comply with the SCRA’s interest rate cap in three ways: (1)
by failing to apply the benefit after receiving written notice
and qualifying active duty military orders; (2) by “failing to
make acceptable efforts to obtain qualifying active duty
military documents from servicemembers who requested
benefits, but did not provide qualifying military documents;”
and (3) by “failing to notify servicemembers that they might
be eligible for SCRA benefits when they provided their
military documents to Defendants for purposes other than
seeking the 6% interest rate.” 234 Although the Department of
Justice’s complaint alleges that the violations were
intentional, 235 the inclusion of allegations related to
borrowers who expressly did not satisfy the statutory
prerequisites for receiving the SCRA’s interest rate benefit
reflects a continuation of the strict liability theory.
C. Expansion of Liability Under the SCRA
In addition to adopting the strict liability theory, the
agencies acted consistent with regulatory theorists’
expectations by expanding the reach of many provisions of the
SCRA in a way that increased the financial recovery under
these enforcement actions. These expansive interpretations
have been adopted both through public consent orders and
through non-public guidance to independent consultants
tasked with reviewing loan files under the settlements
described above. 236 Although non-public, many financial

233. Press Release, Office of Pub. Affairs, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Justice
Department Reaches $60 Million Settlement with Sallie Mae to Resolve
Allegations of Charging Military Servicemembers Excessive Rates on Student
Loans (May 13, 2014), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2014/May/14ag-502.html; Press Release, Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., FDIC Announces
Settlement with Sallie Mae for Unfair and Deceptive Practices and Violations of
the Servicemembers Civil Relief Act (May 13, 2014), available at
http://www.fdic.gov/news/news/press/2014/pr14033.html.
234. Compl. ¶ 16, United States v. Sallie Mae, Inc., No. 1:99-mc-09999 (D.
Del. May 13, 2014); Consent Order ¶ 2, Sallie Mae, Inc., No. 1:99-mc-09999 (D.
Del. May 13, 2014).
235. Compl., supra note 234, ¶ 21.
236. See supra notes 211–15 and accompanying text.
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institutions are being held to these non-public standards even
though they had not been made aware of them. In the
author’s experience while advising clients regarding SCRA
matters, many financial institutions have indicated that the
federal agencies are requiring institutions to adopt these nonpublic—and, in some cases, not previously communicated—
rules going forward, and are imposing liability retroactively
based on these non-public standards. And because these
standards are new, non-public, and inconsistent with the text
of the SCRA itself, it is not surprising that creditors had not
historically adopted these positions. Nor is it surprising that
the retroactive application of these standards would result in
substantial monetary penalties. This section will focus on
two areas of such expansive non-public interpretations:
interpretations regarding the SCRA’s default judgment
protection, and regarding the SCRA’s interest rate cap
protection.
1. Expansion of the Scope of Default Judgment
Protection
Among the ways the agencies have increased financial
penalties under the SCRA is through the expansion of the
scope of the SCRA’s default judgment protection. This
protection was a key component of the original SSCRA of
1918, 237 and as codified was indicative of the balance between
servicemember and creditor the Act was designed to
achieve. 238 The 1918 version of the Act provided that if a
defendant did not make an appearance in any action or
proceeding commenced in any court, the plaintiff must file an
affidavit before judgment is entered stating (1) that the
defendant is in military service; (2) that the defendant is not
in military service; or (3) that the plaintiff is unable to
determine the defendant’s military status. 239 If the plaintiff
did not file such an affidavit, the court was prohibited from
237. Soldiers’ and Sailors’ Civil Relief Act, Pub. L. No. 65-103, § 200, 40 Stat.
440, 441–42 (1918).
238. H.R. REP. NO. 181 (1917), reprinted in 55 CONG. REC. 7789 (1917)
(touting the fact that the bill does not “cast a cloud on all default judgments”
and that a defendant can reopen a judgment only if military service prejudiced
the servicemember’s defense as evidence of “[t]he spirit of moderation which
runs through the bill” and the bill’s “policy of moderation and flexibility.”).
239. Id.
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entering a default judgment against the defendant unless the
court appointed an attorney to represent the defendant. 240
The court could also require the plaintiff to post a bond to
indemnify the defendant against loss as a condition to
entering the default judgment, and take such other action as
the court deemed appropriate. 241 If a default judgment was
entered against a defendant servicemember, and if the
defendant was “prejudiced by reason of his military service in
making a defense thereto,” the servicemember could within
ninety days of leaving military service apply to the court to
open the judgment—”provided . . . that the defendant has a
meritorious or legal defense to the action or some part
Criminal penalties applied to anyone who
thereof.” 242
knowingly filed a false affidavit. 243 Although the language of
the statute has been amended and updated over the nearly
one hundred years since it was first enacted, the framework
of this provision remains very similar to the 1918 version. 244
a. The Affidavit Requirement. While the framework
remains largely the same, the current text contains a number
of important changes from the 1918 SSCRA. One important
change made in the 2003 re-enactment is a clarification of
which party has the obligation under the default judgment
protection. Prior to the enactment of the SCRA, the Act
provided that “the plaintiff, before entering judgment shall
file in the court an affidavit” indicating military status. 245
This language was confusing, in no small part because a
plaintiff cannot enter judgment against a defendant. The
2003 SCRA clarified this provision to provide that “the court,
before entering judgment for the plaintiff, shall require the
plaintiff to file with the court an affidavit” indicating military
status. 246 The change is a small but significant one. Rather
than the SCRA placing the burden on the plaintiff to file the
affidavit as did the SSCRA, the SCRA now places the burden

240. Id.
241. Id.
242. Soldiers’ and Sailors’ Civil Relief Act § 200(4).
243. Id. § 200(2).
244. Compare Servicemembers Civil Relief Act, 50 U.S.C. app. § 521 (2012),
with Soldiers’ and Sailors’ Civil Relief Act, Pub. L. No. 65-103, § 200, 40 Stat.
440, 441–42 (1918).
245. 50 U.S.C. app. § 520(1) (2000) (emphasis added).
246. 50 U.S.C. app. § 521(b)(1) (2012) (emphasis added).
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on the court to require the affidavit. 247 Many litigants—
including pro se plaintiffs, litigants in small claims court, and
unsophisticated or inexperienced counsel—may be unfamiliar
with the SCRA and its affidavit requirement. It is therefore
more appropriate to place the obligation on the court to
require the affidavit, since courts may more reasonably be
expected to have notice of this requirement. The practical
impact of this clarification is that a plaintiff cannot violate
the SCRA by not filing an affidavit because the SCRA
imposes requirements on courts, not plaintiffs. 248
Notwithstanding this significant clarification in
language, federal and state agencies have continued to
enforce the SCRA’s affidavit requirement against plaintiffs—
and to impose substantial civil liability—as if the phrase, “the
court . . . shall require” can be read to mean “the plaintiff . . .
shall file.” 249 And they have taken this view even in cases
where the court itself did not require the plaintiff to file an
affidavit prior to the court entering a default judgment. For
example, in guidance to the independent consultants (ICs)
reviewing loan files as part of the Independent Foreclosure
Review, the agencies instructed the ICs to find liability in any
case where a mortgage servicer did not file an affidavit
regardless of whether or not the court required an affidavit—
Thus,
and even if the court discouraged affidavits. 250
mortgage servicers seeking a default judgment in a court that
did not require, or even discouraged, the filing of an affidavit
were surprised to discover they were being held liable under
the SCRA for complying with a court’s instructions. 251 While
247. Pre-2003 cases placed the obligation on the plaintiff, consistent with the
statutory text at the time. See JAG SCRA GUIDE, supra note 69, § 3-4(a)(4), at
3-14 (collecting cases).
248. Even if a court expressly required a plaintiff to file an affidavit (e.g.,
through local rule or standing order), a plaintiff’s failure to do so would at most
be a violation of the court’s requirement and not of the SCRA.
249. E.g., Consent Judgment, supra note 40, Ex. A at 32–35, Ex. H at 1–11.
250. IC Guidance, supra note 181.
251. In the author’s representation of many financial institutions on SCRA
issues, several of the foreclosure counsel retained by the institution reported
that some courts affirmatively discouraged filing any documents other than
those specified by the court for seeking a default judgment. If an affidavit was
not required by the court, foreclosure counsel followed the court’s instructions
and did not file the affidavit. The agencies have taken the position that this is
not a defense to SCRA liability, notwithstanding the statute’s direction that
“the court . . . shall require” the filing of the affidavit.
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this result is starkly at odds with the text of the statute, it is
consistent with the bureaucratic tendency to adopt aggressive
enforcement positions and to maximize financial recoveries.
b. Reliance on the DMDC. Until recent years, a
creditor seeking to determine whether a person was in
military service was largely dependent on the servicemember,
or someone familiar with the servicemember, informing the
creditor
of
the
servicemember’s
military
status.
Alternatively, the creditor could request a certificate from the
branch of the armed forces. 252 While such certificates were
and are considered prima facie evidence of military service, 253
a creditor who had no notice of a debtor’s military service, or
in which branch the person might be serving, would not know
to request a certificate or from which service branch. And it
seems highly unlikely that Congress intended every creditor
to send letters to every branch of the armed forces any time
the creditor intended to take action against a debtor—
particularly during times of armed conflict, when service
branches would have much more important things to do than
respond to millions of such certificate requests.
In 2002, the Department of Defense’s Defense
Manpower Data Center (DMDC) established a website
through which creditors and other interested parties with
certain information could determine whether a person was on
active duty. 254 The results from the DMDC website searches
were intended to be “certificates” under the Act. 255 The
DMDC website was not publically accessible until April
2005—approximately sixteen months after the SCRA was
enacted. 256 Until April 2012, the information available on the
252. 50 U.S.C. app. § 581(1) (2000); 50 U.S.C. app. § 582(a)–(b) (2012).
253. 50 U.S.C. app. § 581(1) (2000); 50 U.S.C. app. § 582(a) (2012). The
certificate requirement was part of the original SSCRA of 1918. The drafters
explained that the certificate “is designed to remove difficulties that might occur
in the manner of satisfying any court of the fact of service as a soldier or sailor
and of establishing the fact of the death of any one in military service. It does
not make a hard and fast requirement that a certificate shall be furnished in all
cases, but suggests that to be a most satisfactory method. This statement in the
certificate is subject to rebuttal.” Ferry, Rosenbaum & Wigmore, supra note 78,
at 214.
254. Aff. of Kris L. Hoffman 1, Hurley v. Deutsche Bank Trust Co. Ams., No.
1:08-cv-00361 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 22, 2010) [hereinafter Hoffman Affidavit].
255. Id. at 2 (attesting that an inquiry will result in a “certificate” bearing
the facsimile signature of the Director of the DMDC).
256. Id. at 1.
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DMDC website was limited: it would provide only (1) the
name of the person as submitted by the requestor; (2) the
date the person first entered military service (but not the date
the person entered the most recent period of military service
or information about any intervening periods when a person
was not on active duty); (3) whether the individual is on
active duty on the date the search is performed; (4) the
individual’s active duty end date (if the person was in
military service within the previous 367 days and is no longer
on active duty); and (5) the military branch in which the
individual served or is serving. 257 Thus, the DMDC did not
provide all of the information a creditor would need to
determine SCRA eligibility, such as active duty status at time
of loan origination. And the DMDC website permitted only
single searches; it did not provide multiple-search (i.e., batch
search) capability. In April 2012, after many of the DOJ’s
and federal banking agencies’ enforcement actions had either
settled or had been initiated, the DMDC modified the website
to allow for batch searching; to allow for searches of historical
“as of” dates; and to provide the date a reservist received
orders to report for active duty. 258
Unfortunately, even after the DMDC was updated to
provide more of the information creditors need to determine
SCRA eligibility, the DMDC website has suffered from
The DMDC itself has
chronic accuracy problems. 259
acknowledged accuracy problems, which it characterizes as a

257. Id. at 2. In the experience of the author, having run dozens of DMDC
searches, the beginning dates returned during this period reflected the date the
individual first entered military service. For example, a person who entered
military service five years ago and served for one year, left military service for
three years, and then resumed military service would have a beginning date in
the DMDC of five years ago.
258. Def. Manpower Data Ctr., SCRA-News: Announcing SCRA 2.0,
SERVICEMEMBERS CIVIL RELIEF ACT, SERVICEMEMBERS CIVIL RELIEF ACT
(SCRA)
WEBSITE
(Apr.
10,
2012),
http://www.dmdc.osd.mil/appj/scra/news.xhtml; see also GAO MORTGAGE
FORECLOSURES, supra note 22, at 19 (noting that prior to April 2012, only single
searches were available); GAO SCRA REPORT, supra note 7, at 10 (noting that
the April 2012 upgrade to the DMDC permitted batch file searches).
Additionally, in the author’s experience, the beginning dates were changed to
reflect the beginning date of the servicemember’s most recent period of military
service.
259. E.g., GAO MORTGAGE FORECLOSURES, supra note 22, at 19 (discussing
reports of accuracy problems).
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“small error rate.” 260 Nevertheless, the DMDC cautions users
of its website from relying on the website if there are any
other indicia of a servicemember’s military service, stating
that even if the DMDC website indicates a person is not on
active duty, a person may be liable under the “punitive
provisions of the SCRA.” 261 The DMDC has also noted that it
previously had only captured active duty periods of thirty
days or more, 262 even though servicemembers on active duty
may still be SCRA eligible during those shorter periods of
service, and that its use of “active duty” is more limited than
the SCRA’s use of that term. 263 Additionally, creditors have
observed significant lag times between a person entering
military service and the information appearing on the DMDC
website. 264 These accuracy and latency issues can cause
substantial problems for creditors relying on the website,
which many are required to do under various settlement

260. E.g., Def. Manpower Data Ctr., Servicemembers Civil Relief Act Website
v. 2.9 Users Guide, SERVICEMEMBERS CIVIL RELIEF ACT (SCRA) WEBSITE 3
(2012). In the author’s experience working with clients, this error rate has been
as high as fifteen percent.
261. Id. at 3, 6. At least one court has held that reliance on the DMDC
search results in executing an affidavit indicating whether a defendant was in
military service is insufficient when other documents (in this case, a bankruptcy
petition) show military service. In re Templehoff, 339 B.R. 49, 51–54 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 2005).
262. Def. Manpower Data Ctr., supra note 260, at 14 (“Prior to 2007, DMDC
only received information on active duty periods of more than 30 consecutive
days.”).
263. Id. (“Coverage under the SCRA is broader in some cases and includes
some categories of persons on active duty for purposes of the SCRA who would
not be reported as on Active Duty in this file.”).
264. During the Independent Foreclosure Review (IFR), see supra notes 212–
17 and accompanying text, independent consultants and mortgage servicers
reported lags in the updating of the DMDC website. They identified cases
where the mortgage servicer had relied on DMDC search results indicating a
person was not in military service, but later DMDC website searches indicated
the person had been on active duty at the time of foreclosure. IC Guidance,
supra note 181. In the author’s experience in working with many clients on
DMDC search issues, the author has heard of latency periods as large as thirty
days. The DMDC reports, however, that its database is updated daily and that
most service branches submit data to it daily. Letter from Col. Paul E.
Kantwill, Dir., Office of Legal Policy, Dep’t of Def., to Mr. John H. Dalton,
President, Hous. Policy Council, Fin. Servs. Roundtable 3 (Jan. 3, 2013) (on file
with author) [hereinafter Kantwill Letter] (“DMDC updates all data within 24
hours of receipt from the Service Components, and most of the components
submit data daily to DMDC.”).
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agreements with federal regulators, 265 since the creditor may
take action in reliance on the DMDC’s representation—and
without any information to suggest that the DMDC’s
representation is inaccurate—only to learn after the fact that
the debtor was in military service and that the creditor may
be subject to strict liability. 266 The DMDC has stated that it
continues to work on improving the accuracy of the website. 267
But that may be cold comfort to those who have been
subjected to civil liability for relying on the DMDC website’s
results.
Although the DMDC certificates are by statute
deemed prima facie evidence of the individual’s military
service or lack thereof, the federal agencies have imposed
liability on mortgage servicers in cases where the servicer
relied on a DMDC website result and otherwise had no
knowledge of the borrower’s military service. 268 Creditors
who relied on a certificate from the DMDC indicating that a
borrower was not in military service, and who otherwise had
no knowledge of the servicemember’s military service, were
not simply required to return the servicemember to the status
quo ex ante, but were also required to pay substantial civil
penalties. 269 The agencies’ imposition of liability in such
cases—where a creditor relied on a certificate issued by the
Department of Defense’s DMDC database—is unjustifiable
under the SCRA, but is consistent with bureaucratic
incentives to maximize recoveries.

265. E.g., Consent Order, supra note 220, ¶ 4.
266. Even consultants working with the government have experienced these
accuracy issues with the DMDC website. During the IFR, ICs were instructed
to re-run their batch testing of in-scope borrower populations because of
concerns that previous search results were inaccurate. IC Guidance, supra note
181.
267. Kantwill Letter, supra note 264, at 1 (“DMDC has, and will continue to,
work with its Service Components to identify known areas of data accuracy and
timeliness concerns. While recognizing that no system is perfect, we are
committed to continuously improving the quality, reliability, and efficacy of
available information.”).
268. E.g., IC Guidance, supra note 181 (stating that the SCRA’s foreclosure
protection provision is a strict liability statute and that “there is no safe harbor
for servicers who conducted a DMDC query that did not accurately report the
Early Alert status.”).
269. Id. at 2–3. The agencies indicated, however, that they might consider a
reduced civil penalty in a case where an affidavit was based on a DMDC result
which later turned out to be inaccurate. Id.
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c. Servicemembers with Notice of the Proceedings.
Prior to the 2003 reenactment of the SCRA, there was
confusion about the interaction between the SCRA’s default
judgment protection and the SCRA’s provision allowing a
servicemember to seek a stay of civil proceedings when
military service materially affected the servicemember’s
ability to participate in the proceeding. 270 The principal
difference between the default judgment and stay protections
is that the default judgment protection permits
servicemembers to seek vacation of a default judgment in
certain circumstances. 271 Some had argued that the two
provisions were designed for mutually exclusive situations:
the default judgment provision for when a servicemember
does not have notice of a proceeding, and the stay provision
for when the servicemember does. 272 Yet others argued that
the default judgment and stay protections are two items on
the menu of options from which servicemembers may
choose. 273
In 1990, an effort was made to resolve this tension by
providing that an application for a stay—and thus notice of
the action—would not preclude the operation of the default
judgment protection. 274 A proposal was made to amend the
default judgment provision to provide: “An application for a
stay pursuant to section 201 of this Act shall not be an
appearance that would preclude a service member from
This proposal was
reopening a default judgment.” 275
eventually withdrawn. 276
In 2003, Congress took a different direction. In
reporting the bill that eventually became the SCRA, the
270. 50 U.S.C. app. § 522 (2000).
271. Id. § 521(g).
272. McDonough, Huckabee & Gentile, supra note 109, at 678, 687 (“It is
inappropriate and inconsistent with case law to allow a servicemember two
forms of relief, when each was initially adopted to protect servicemembers in
mutually exclusive circumstances.”).
273. JAG SCRA GUIDE, supra note 69, § 3-6, at 3-36 (“[W]hen a
servicemember has notice of a proceeding, that servicemember will have to
decide whether to enter an appearance, attempt to be released from duty to
defend, and to defend or whether to await a default judgment and attempt to
reopen it at a more convenient time.”).
274. Huckabee, supra note 112, at 161.
275. Id.
276. Id. at 163, 172 (“The amendments were eventually deleted due to
political compromise.”).
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House Committee on Veterans’ Affairs explained that the
SCRA was intended to clarify that the default judgment and
stay provisions apply in mutually exclusive circumstances.
The report stated that the “protections against default
judgments would clarify that the protections under this
section are intended to apply when a servicemember does not
receive notice of an action or proceeding.” 277 To effect this
clarification, the default judgment provision was amended to
provide that “[i]f a servicemember who is a defendant in an
action covered by this section receives actual notice of the
action, the servicemember may request a stay of
proceeding . . . .” 278 The 2003 SCRA also clarified that the
stay of proceedings protection applied to cases where the
servicemember has notice of a proceeding. 279 For example,
the stay of proceedings section was given the heading “Stay of
proceedings when servicemember has notice.” 280 The first
subsection of the provision also clarifies that the stay of
proceedings applies to any civil action or proceeding when the
servicemember “has received notice of the action or
proceeding.” 281
Notwithstanding these clarifications, the agencies
have imposed civil penalties on mortgage servicers when the
servicemember had actual knowledge of the foreclosure
proceeding yet took no apparent effort to seek a stay or
otherwise participate in the proceeding. In guidance to the
independent consultants conducting the file reviews required
by many of the settlements, the agencies do not make any
provision for viewing cases differently where a borrower
clearly had notice of a proceeding than cases where there may
be no evidence of borrower notice. 282 Creditors were surprised
to learn that some servicemembers would receive six-figure
checks as compensation for foreclosures when the
servicemember had notice of the foreclosure proceeding but
277. H.R. REP. NO. 108-81, at 37 (2003); see also id. at 45 (distinguishing
between the procedures for the default judgment protection and those for a
request for a stay “when the service member has notice of a hearing.”).
278. Servicemembers Civil Relief Act, 50 U.S.C. app. § 521(f) (2003).
279. H.R. REP. NO. 108-81, at 45–46 (explaining that the provision regarding
stay of proceedings “when the servicemember defendant has notice” was
amended for clarity).
280. 50 U.S.C. app. § 522.
281. Id. § 522(a)(2).
282. IC Guidance, supra note 181, at 14.
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took no effort to stay or otherwise participate in the
proceeding. 283
Such windfalls for servicer inaction are
fundamentally inconsistent with the balancing of
servicemember and creditor interests built into the Act, but
are consistent with the bureaucratic tendency toward large
financial recoveries.
2. Expansion of the Interest Rate Protection
The predicted bureaucratic proclivities have been
further manifest by the agencies’ expansion of liability under
the SCRA’s interest rate protection. The interest rate cap is
one of the most frequently used SCRA financial protections. 284
One of the central additions of the 1942 amendments, the
interest rate protection caps at six percent the interest a
servicemember can incur on credit obligations, originated
prior to the servicemember’s period of military service. 285 The
act requires that a creditor forgive any interest above six
percent and reduce the periodic payment in accordance with
the reduction in interest. 286 The servicemember is required to
provide the creditor with “written notice and a copy of the
military orders calling the servicemember to military service”
to qualify for the benefit, and may do so up to 180 days after
leaving military service. 287 Once the servicemember qualifies
for the benefit, the creditor must apply the benefit effective as
of the date of military service—which often will result in a
retroactive application of the benefit. 288 Consistent with the
SCRA’s balancing of servicemember and commercial
interests, a court may grant a creditor relief from this
protection if it appears that the servicemember’s ability to
pay the contract rate of interest is not materially affected by
the servicemember’s military service. 289
283. This conduct by some servicemembers was inconsistent with guidance
that some commentators have been providing to servicemembers for decades.
See, e.g., Garth K. Chandler, The Impact of a Request for a Stay of Proceedings
Under the Soldiers’ and Sailors’ Civil Relief Act, 102 MIL. L. REV. 169, 178–79
(1983).
284. Meixell, supra note 137, at 2.
285. 50 U.S.C. app. § 527(a)(1).
286. Id. § 527(a)(2)–(3).
287. Id. § 527(b)(1).
288. Id. § 527(b)(2).
289. Id. § 527(c). Some have argued that the burden of proving no material
effect rests on the creditor. See, e.g., JAG SCRA GUIDE, supra note 114, § 3-12,
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The widespread use of the interest rate cap in the
early 1990s during the Persian Gulf War drew renewed
attention to this provision and highlighted some of its
shortcomings.
Financial services products had evolved
substantially since 1942, and the application of the then-50year-old law to the modern consumer credit marketplace
created unforeseen challenges. 290 Additionally, the Act was
silent regarding how the interest rate protection should be
implemented, leaving servicemembers and creditors
guessing. 291
In 1990, the House and Senate Committees on
Veterans’ Affairs held joint hearings on the SCRA’s interest
rate protection. During these hearings, several witnesses
testified that creditors were asking servicemembers to
provide the creditor with a written request and copy of the
orders calling the servicemember to military service so that
the creditor could confirm military service, know the effective
date of the benefit, and identify which obligations might be
eligible for the benefit. 292 For example, the CEO of Navy
Federal Credit Union testified:
We are requiring only a statement in writing, in no
particular format, from our members advising us that they
at 3-34. However, this is inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s instruction
that the burden of proof be determined on a case-by-case basis. Boone v.
Lightner, 319 U.S. 561, 569 (1943); see also supra notes 165–69.
290. See, e.g., James Pottorff, A Look at the Credit Industry’s Approach to the
Six Percent Limit on Interest Rates, 1990 ARMY LAW. 49, 50 (1990) (“The firsttime application of this law to a computerized credit industry has resulted in
numerous unanticipated problems for creditors and debtors alike.”); id. at 52
(“Even for creditors who correctly apply section 526, compliance is sometimes
technically difficult.”); see also supra notes 133–136 and accompanying text.
291. See, e.g., McDonough, Huckabee & Gentile, supra note 109, at 680.
292. See, e.g., Soldiers’ and Sailors’ Civil Relief Act and Veterans’
Reemployment Rights: Joint Hearing Before the Comms. on Veterans’ Affairs of
the H.R. and U.S. Sen., supra note 129, at 48–49 (statement of Robert J.
Engelstad, Senior Vice President, Mortg. and Lender Standards, Fed. Nat’l
Mortg. Ass’n) (stating that FNMA (Fannie Mae) required servicemembers to
provide notice and a copy of the call-up orders) [hereinafter Engelstad
Statement]; Soldiers’ and Sailors’ Civil Relief Act and Veterans’ Reemployment
Rights: Joint Hearing Before the Comms. on Veterans’ Affairs of the H.R. and
U.S. Sen., supra note 129, at 186 (statement of Thomas J. Hughes, President
and Chief Exec. Officer, Navy Fed. Credit Union) (same) [hereinafter Hughes
Statement]; see also Pottorff, supra note 290, at 50 (“As a general rule, these
organizations [the GSEs] require that mortgage issuers obtain a copy of a
reserve component service member’s orders to active duty before granting the
reduction in interest.”).
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are being called to active duty and requesting relief under
the Act for whichever of the many types of credit they may
have with Navy Federal. A copy of the call-up orders is
sufficient confirmation. 293

Testimony was also taken regarding whether the
interest rate protection should be self-effecting, or whether
servicemembers should be required to take steps to initiate
the protection. Some argued that it should be viewed as selfeffecting. 294 Most witnesses testified, however, that orders
were necessary to assist creditors in properly applying the
protection. 295 And at that time the Judge Advocate General’s
Office provided guidance that servicemembers were required
to inform creditors of their military service and to provide a
request for the SCRA interest rate cap and a copy of military
orders. 296 When the SCRA was enacted in 2003, the Act
included the requirement that a servicemember provide
“written notice and a copy of the military orders calling the
servicemember to military service” to qualify for the
The House Committee on Veterans’ Affairs
benefit. 297
explained that this requirement “codif[ied] practices
established during the Persian Gulf War” and that it believed
the “burden should be on the servicemember to initiate the
protection.” 298
Although the statutory text and guidance from
legislative history are consistent and quite clear regarding
what the SCRA requires a servicemember to provide to
qualify for the interest rate protection, the agencies’
aggressive interpretations of this requirement have imposed
293. Hughes Statement, supra note 292, at 186.
294. See, e.g., Memorandum from Henry B. Shepard, Jr., Lynne B. Barr,
Gordon H. Piper & Bradford J. Smith, Goodwin, Procter & Hoar, Federal Laws
Protecting Persons in Military Service, (Aug. 27, 1990), reprinted in Soldiers’
and Sailors’ Civil Relief Act and Veterans’ Reemployment Rights: Joint Hearing
Before the Comms. on Veterans’ Affairs of the H.R. and U.S. Sen., supra note
129, at 156.
295. See, e.g., Hughes Statement, supra note 292, at 186 (“There can be
nothing automatic, since the financial institution needs to know what
individuals and which of their obligations are affected.”).
296. McDonough, Huckabee & Gentile, supra note 109, at 682 (citing Gregory
M. Huckabee, Legal Assistance for Those Who Go in Harm’s Way, 71 MIL. REV.
33 (1991); Dale Ellis, Give Credit Where Credit is Due, 8 COMPLEAT LAW. 19, 21
(1991)).
297. Servicemembers Civil Relief Act, 50 U.S.C. app. § 527(b)(1) (2003).
298. H.R. REP. NO. 108-81, at 39 (2003).
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liability for practices that not only comply with the plain
language of the SCRA, but also complied with guidance from
other regulatory agencies.
Four areas of expansion in
particular demonstrate the agencies’ expansion of liability
under the SCRA: (1) what qualifies as “written notice;” (2)
what qualifies as a copy of “military orders calling the
servicemember to military service;” (3) what constitutes
“interest” under the SCRA; and (4) what happens when a
servicemember fails to satisfy the statutory prerequisites.
a. What is “written notice”? One significant area of
expansion in the agencies’ recent SCRA enforcement efforts is
what constitutes “written notice.” Many in the industry, and
indeed most administrative agencies, had interpreted “notice”
as synonymous with “request.” But the DOJ and federal
banking agencies departed from this interpretation, instead
taking the position in their recent enforcement actions that
virtually any communication informing a creditor that a
servicemember is in military service constitutes the required
“notice.” As a result, the agencies have since imposed liability
in thousands of cases where borrowers had not requested
SCRA interest rate protections. 299
Prior to the recent enforcement actions, the consensus
view was that “notice” meant “request.” During the 1990
hearings, some witnesses characterized the requirement for
“notice” as requiring “notice” of qualification for the interest
rate benefit. 300 The American Forces Information Service—a
division of the Department of Defense—emphasized that “the
interest rate reduction doesn’t occur automatically—service
members must request it.” 301 Most government agencies have
299. See, e.g., Consent Order at 5, Sallie Mae, Inc., No. 1:99-mc-09999 (D.
Del. May 13, 2014) (clarifying that nearly half of the settlement fund
established by the consent order is attributable to borrowers who had not
requested SCRA interest rate benefits).
300. See, e.g., Engelstad Statement, supra note 292, at 138 (discussing
“notice” of eligibility requirements).
301. AM. FORCES INFO. SERV., SOLDIERS’ AND SAILORS’ CIVIL RELIEF ACT
PROVIDES
UMBRELLA
OF
PROTECTION
2
(2002),
available
at
http://www.defense.gov/specials/Relief_Act_Revision/index.html;
The
Servicemembers’ Civil Relief Act and the Soldiers’ and Sailors’ Civil Relief Act,
Hearings on H.R. 5111 and H.R. 4017 Before the Subcomm. on Benefits of the H.
Comm. on Veterans’ Affairs, 107th Cong., 2d Sess. 130 (2002) (emphasis added).
The American Forces Information Service was disestablished in 2008, at which
time Department of Defense formed the Defense Media Activity. U.S. DEP’T OF
DEF., DIR. 5105.74 (Dec. 18, 2007).

2015]

SERVICEMEMBERS CIVIL RELIEF ACT

113

similarly interpreted “notice” as synonymous with “request.”
For example, the Department of Education’s regulations
provide that a servicemember with student loans must
provide a written “request” and copy of orders to be eligible
for the interest rate benefit, 302 and has explained that it views
“notice” and “request” as “substantively the same.” 303 In a
2012 settlement, the DOJ also equated written notice to a
creditor’s receipt of a written “request” for SCRA benefits, 304
although, as discussed below, the DOJ subsequently departed
from this position.
Similarly, the Consumer Financial
Protection Bureau’s website instructs servicemembers that to
obtain the SCRA’s interest rate benefit “[y]ou will need to
send a written request to your servicer, and will also need to
provide your servicer with a copy of your orders calling you on
to active duty.” 305 The Judge Advocate General’s School also
interpreted “notice” to mean “request,” 306 and included in its
SCRA Guide a “Sample Letter to Creditor Requesting
And the OCC, in its
Reduction to 6% Interest.” 307
Comptroller’s Handbook that predates its enforcement actions
against financial institutions and that as of this writing is
still in circulation, explained that a creditor must reduce the
interest rate to six percent “[u]pon receiving a written request
for relief and a copy of the service member’s military

302. 34 C.F.R. § 682.202(a)(4), (a)(8) (2013).
303. Letter from Pamela Moran, Dep’t of Educ., to the Consumer Bankers
Assoc., Educ. Fin. Council, Nat’l Council of Higher Educ. Loan Programs & the
Student Loan Servicing Alliance 1 (undated) (on file with author). In response
to a request that SCRA interest rate benefits be provided solely on basis of
receipt of military orders, the Department of Education stated, “[T]his
suggestion is not consistent with the SCRA. It also is not consistent with the
Department’s regulations in this area because it eliminates the servicemember’s
request.” Id.
304. Consent Order at 6, 8, Capital One, N.A., No. 1:12-cv-00828 (E.D. Va.
July 26, 2012).
305. CONSUMER FIN. PROTECTION BUREAU, How can I Reduce my Student
Loan Interest Rate under the Servicemembers Civil Relief Act (SCRA)?,
http://www.consumerfinance.gov/askcfpb/1501/how-can-i-reduce-my-studentloan-interest-rate-under-servicemembers-civil-relief-act-scra.html
(updated
June 17, 2013) (emphasis added).
306. THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL’S LEGAL CENTER & SCHOOL, U.S.
ARMY, COMMANDER’S LEGAL HANDBOOK, at 247 (2013) (explaining that to
qualify for the interest rate protection “[s]ervice member must request and
provide copy of orders.”).
307. JAG SCRA GUIDE, supra note 69, app. B, at B-1.
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orders.” 308 As discussed below, though, the agencies have
since changed this position in its enforcement actions
(although it has not taken this previous guidance out of
circulation).
These consistent interpretations of “notice” as
synonymous with “request” made it even more surprising
when the federal agencies provided guidance to independent
consultants conducting file reviews required by various
settlements that “notice” need not be a request, but could be
any form of notice of military service to the creditor. 309 In
other words, “notice” no longer meant notice of the intent to
claim SCRA benefits, but merely notice of military service.
This guidance appeared to ignore the many other reasons a
servicemember may submit military orders to a creditor, such
as to request a military deferment 310 or to demonstrate
hardship in connection with a short sale request. 311 The
retroactive application of this new standard had resulted in a
substantial expansion of liability for financial institutions
that had provided servicemember with a deferment, short
sale, or other assistance requested by the servicemember, but
not with SCRA interest rate benefits that were not requested
by the borrower. 312 And even more surprisingly, the agencies
imposed liability in cases where the notice was provided
orally rather than in writing. 313 This expansion of the

308. OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, COMPTROLLER’S
HANDBOOK: SERVICEMEMBERS CIVIL RELIEF ACT OF 2003 2 (2011) (emphasis
added).
309. See, e.g., IC Guidance, supra note 181. This guidance was inconsistent
with the OCC’s own previous guidance. See supra note 294.
310. E.g., FED. STUDENT AID, OFFICE OF THE DEP’T OF EDUC., Deferment and
Forbearance, http://studentaid.ed.gov/repay-loans/deferment-forbearance (last
visited Feb. 14, 2014).
311. E.g., FED. HOUS. FIN. AGENCY, Fact Sheet: FHFA Short Sale Assistance
for Military Home Owners with Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac Loans
[hereinafter
FHFA
Fact
Sheet],
http://www.militaryfamily.org/assets/pdf/MilitaryShortSaleAssistanceFactSheet
F.PDF (last visited Jan. 28, 2014) (requiring copies of military orders for
servicemember to qualify for short sale); see also FANNIE MAE, Servicing Guide
Announcement
SVC-2012-19,
(Aug.
12,
2012),
https://www.fanniemae.com/content/announcement/svc1219.pdf (same).
312. The DOJ established a penalty formula for alleged interest rate
violations of a refund of the difference between the rate charged and six percent,
plus the greater of three times that amount or $500. Consent Order at 29–30,
Capital One, N.A., No. 1:12-cv-00828 (E.D. Va. July 26, 2012).
313. See, e.g., IC Guidance, supra note 181.
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statutory requirement that the servicemember provide
“written notice” to include oral requests is impossible to
reconcile with the statute.
But it is consistent with
regulatory theory’s predictions.
b. What is a “military order calling the servicemember
to military service”? Another area where the agencies have
expanded creditor liability is by expanding the meaning of
“military orders calling the servicemember to military
service.” 314 “Military service” is a defined term under the
SCRA, and for members of the U.S. armed forces generally
means “active duty.” 315 Thus, orders calling a servicemember
“to military service” can only mean those orders calling the
servicemember to “active duty” (i.e., ordering the
servicemember to leave a non-active duty status and enter
active duty). 316 As discussed above, this requirement was
added to the statute to allow creditors to know the time
period during which to apply the interest rate cap, since the
cap often must be applied retroactively. 317 Only the orders
calling the servicemember to active duty provide this critical
information to the creditor.
Here again, the agencies have departed from the plain
meaning of the statute in imposing substantial liability.
Servicemembers receive myriad different orders during their
military service. These include permanent change of station
(PCS) orders, temporary change of station (TCS) orders,
temporary duty (TDY) orders, as well as many others. 318
While these orders are certainly “military orders” requiring a
servicemember to take certain action, these are not the orders
314. See Servicemembers Civil Relief Act, 50 U.S.C. app. § 527(b)(1) (2012).
315. Id. § 511(2)(A)(i).
316. See, e.g., CONSUMER FIN. PROTECTION BUREAU, How can I Reduce my
Student Loan Interest Rate under the Servicemembers Civil Relief Act (SCRA)?,
http://www.consumerfinance.gov/askcfpb/1501/how-can-i-reduce-my-studentloan-interest-rate-under-servicemembers-civil-relief-act-scra.html
(updated
June 17, 2013) (“You will need to send a written request to your servicer, and
will also need to provide your servicer with a copy of your orders calling you on
to active duty.”).
317. See supra notes 190–98 and accompanying text; see also McDonough,
Huckabee & Gentile, supra note 109, at 688 (“The orders also indicate the
period of time for which the servicemember is ordered to duty . . . . [and]
provide[] guidance to the creditor on when and how long the interest protection
should be applied.”).
318. E.g., Army Reg. 600-8-105, Military Orders, available at
http://www.apd.army.mil/pdffiles/r600_8_105.pdf.
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that call the servicemember to military service; rather, they
are orders instructing a servicemember already in military
service to take specified action.
Yet federal agencies
providing guidance in connection with the file reviews
required by the various SCRA settlements have concluded
that these orders and many others which do not call the
servicemember to military service are qualifying orders for
SCRA purposes. 319 And in the DOJ’s settlement with Sallie
Mae, the DOJ appears to signal that a qualifying military
“order” includes any document prepared by a branch of the
armed forces, the Department of Defense, or a borrower’s
commanding officer indicating active duty military service—
even if the document is not an “order” under any accepted
meaning of that term. 320 And because many creditors had not
provided benefits where servicemembers had not provided
qualifying military orders, the agencies have imposed
substantial civil liability on that basis. 321
The drafters of the SCRA understood that there is a
difference between military orders and PCS orders. This is
evidenced by the specific inclusion of PCS orders in the
SCRA’s lease protection. 322 There, Congress expressly allows
PCS orders to fulfill the eligibility requirements to terminate
a lease of premises or an automobile. 323 It is a longstanding
rule of statutory interpretation that “[w]here Congress
includes particular language in one section of a statute but
omits it in another section of the same Act, it is generally
presumed that Congress acts intentionally and purposely in
the disparate inclusion or exclusion.” 324 It follows that the
drafters’ omission of PCS orders in Section 527 should be seen
as intentional—and that PCS orders, like other orders that do
not call the servicemember to military service, should not be
319. See, e.g., IC Guidance, supra note 181.
320. Consent Order at 17, Sallie Mae, Inc., No. 1:99-mc-09999, (D. Del. May
13, 2014) (explaining that qualifying military orders include documents such
DD-214 forms and letters from a borrower’s commanding officer to the creditor).
321. See, e.g., Kirk D. Jensen, John C. Redding & Sasha Leonhardt, Highway
to the Danger Zone: Automotive Lending and the Servicemembers Civil Relief
Act, 131 BANKING L.J. 126, 137 (2014); Kirk D. Jensen & Sasha Leonhardt,
Students, Loan Servicers, and the Servicemembers Civil Relief Act, 19 WESTLAW
J. BANK & LENDER LIABILITY 1, 3 (Oct. 7, 2013).
322. Servicemembers Civil Relief Act, 50 U.S.C. app. § 535 (2012).
323. Id.
324. Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983).
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considered “military orders” under the interest rate
protection. 325 But again, while the agencies’ position is
inconsistent with the Act, it is consistent with bureaucratic
tendencies.
c. What is “interest”? Yet another aggressive agency
interpretation resulting in increased creditor liability is in an
unprecedented expansion of the meaning of “interest.” The
statute includes a broad but non-illustrative definition of the
term “interest”: interest includes “service charges, renewal
charges, fees, or any other charges (except bona fide
insurance) with respect to an obligation or liability.” 326 While
the plain language of the definition of “interest” is undeniably
broad, the language must be interpreted consistent with the
ordinary meaning of the words used. 327
For centuries, the term “interest” has been used to
refer to the creditor’s compensation for the borrower’s use of
the money borrowed. In the eighteenth century, William
Blackstone wrote that “when money is lent on a contract to
receive not only the principal sum again, but also an increase
by way of compensation for the use; which generally is called
interest . . . .” 328 Thus, “interest” was the compensation to the
creditor for the borrower’s use of the borrowed funds. This
understanding of the meaning of “interest” as referring to
compensation to the creditor continued into the nineteenth
century. For example, a law dictionary from the 1850s
defined interest as “[t]he compensation which is paid to the
lender or by the debtor to the creditor for . . . use [of
money].” 329 A few decades later, the Supreme Court similarly
explained that “[i]nterest is the compensation allowed by law,
or fixed by the parties, for the use or forbearance of money or
325. In 2011, the Department of Defense worked with a financial services
trade association to develop an alternative form servicemembers can submit to
request the SCRA benefit that is easier to interpret than military orders. See
GAO MORTGAGE FORECLOSURES, supra note 22, at 20. But while this form may
be easier to understand and interpret than a military order, it is not an “order
calling the servicemember to military service” as required by the statute. Id.
326. 50 U.S.C. app. § 527(d)(1).
327. E.g., Cuomo v. Clearing House Ass’n, LLC, 557 U.S. 519, 539 (2009)
(“[T]he ordinary meaning of the words chosen by Congress provides the starting
point for interpreting the statute.”).
328. 2 William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England 454 (1915)
(emphasis added).
329. J. Bouvier, A LAW DICTIONARY 652 (6th ed. 1856) (quoted in Smiley v.
Citibank (South Dakota), N.A., 517 U.S. 735, 745 (1996) (emphasis added)).
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as damages for its detention.” 330
This understanding of the meaning of “interest” has
continued into the present day. Indeed, in 1996 the Supreme
Court in Smiley v. Citibank (South Dakota), N.A. relied on
long-standing precedent and definitions in concluding that
“interest” included compensation to the creditor in addition to
the rate. 331 And more recently, Black’s Law Dictionary has
defined “interest” as “the compensation fixed by agreement or
allowed by law for the use or detention of money, or for the
loss of money by one who is entitled to its use.” 332
When Congress used the term “interest” in the SCRA
and in the SSCRA, it must be presumed that it did so in the
context of this centuries-old understanding of the meaning of
the term. 333 Accordingly, “interest” in the SCRA should be
interpreted consistent with its well-established historical
meaning, which includes “service charges, renewal charges,
fees, or any other charges” retained by the creditor, but does
not include fees or charges, such as those paid to third
parties, that do not compensate the creditor.
In the SCRA enforcement actions, however, the federal
agencies have taken a more expansive view of the meaning of
“interest” under the Act. They have concluded that any fee or
330. Brown v. Hiatts, 82 U.S. 177, 185 (1873) (emphasis added).
331. Smiley, 517 U.S. at 745–46.
332. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 397 (9th ed. 2009).
333. The historical meaning of “interest” has consistently been applied in
other federal and state laws that address interest and similar concepts. For
example, the National Bank Act—enacted prior to the 1942 enactment of the
definition of interest in the SSCRA—empowers national banks to charge
“interest” on obligations. 12 U.S.C. § 85 (2012). The OCC has defined the
meaning of “interest” in its regulations: “The term ‘interest’ as used in 12 U.S.C.
§ 85 includes any payment compensating a creditor or prospective creditor for an
extension of credit . . . .” 12 C.F.R. § 7.4001(a) (2014) (emphasis added). State
law also generally follows the historical understanding of the term “interest.”
For example, California law defines interest as “any fee, bonus, commission,
discount or other compensation” received from a borrower. CAL. CONST. art. XV,
§ 1(2) (2014) (emphasis added). Similarly, New York law excludes from the
definition of “interest” reasonable fees, charges and costs for “services actually
and necessarily rendered,” including costs for appraisals, title examinations,
legal services, and inspections. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. III, § 4.3(b)
(2014). Texas law also defines “interest” as “compensation for the use,
forbearance, or detention of money.” TEX. FIN. CODE ANN. § 301.002(a)(4)
(2013) (emphasis added). When Congress used the term “interest” in the SCRA,
it did so in the context of the numerous federal and state laws that consistently
define “interest” as including various charges that compensate creditors for the
extension of credit but excluding charges that are not retained by the creditor.
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charge related to the underlying credit obligation is part of
“interest” for SCRA purposes, specifically including inspection
fees, Broker Price Opinion (BPO) fees, legal fees, and
foreclosure-related charges—fees that generally are not
retained by and therefore do not “compensate” the creditor.334
Under this analysis, the only fees excluded are those for a
separate product or service the consumer purchased
independently, such as debt protection or credit monitoring. 335
This expansive interpretation of “interest” leads to the
unprecedented result that charges for services such as
property preservation (e.g., charges for lawn mowing,
winterizing a home, and performing other assorted repairs)
are for the first time under any federal or state law
considered part of “interest.” The result of this expansive
interpretation is that alleged “violations” of the law have been
found in many cases where charges were imposed that were
not retained by the creditor, did not compensate the creditor,
and would not be considered “interest” in any other context.
While this expansion of liability is inconsistent with the
structure and text of the statute, it is consistent with the
bureaucratic tendencies observed by regulatory theorists.
d. What happens when a servicemember fails to satisfy
the statutory prerequisites? Historically, the financial services
industry interpreted the requirements of “written notice” and
“a copy of military orders calling the servicemember to
military service” as being statutory prerequisites that a
servicemember must satisfy to qualify for the SCRA’s interest
rate benefit.
Just as taxpayers must satisfy specific
requirements to receive tax refunds, the industry believed
servicemembers must satisfy the SCRA’s requirements to
qualify for SCRA benefits.
This view was supported by the SCRA requiring that
the Department of Defense educate servicemembers
regarding SCRA benefits. Section 515 of the SCRA orders the
Secretary of each branch of the military to “ensure that notice
of the benefits accorded by this Act is provided in writing to
persons in military service and to persons entering military
service.” 336 Consistent with this provision, creditors have
334. IC Guidance, supra note 181.
335. Id.
336. 50 U.S.C. app. § 515 (2000).
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previously assumed that the responsibility of educating
servicemembers about SCRA benefits rested on the
Department of Defense rather than on creditors. This view
was reinforced by the legislative history to the SCRA, which
clarified that the burden of satisfying the statutory
prerequisites
was
intentionally
placed
on
the
servicemember. 337
In recent SCRA enforcement activity, the agencies
have signaled that they now expect creditors to shoulder
much of the burden of educating servicemembers regarding
SCRA benefits.
Specifically, the Sallie Mae Complaint
indicates that the agencies believe a creditor violates the
SCRA if the creditor “fail[s] to make acceptable efforts” to
elicit qualifying documents from servicemembers who have
not otherwise provided them, or if the creditor “fail[s] to
notify servicemembers that they may be eligible for SCRA
benefits” when they provide military documents for reasons
unrelated to SCRA benefits. 338 And because more than half of
the Sallie Mae settlement fund is allocated toward borrowers
who did not provide a written request and copy of active duty
orders, 339 it appears that this interpretation will be enforced
retroactively. While this shifting of the burden of educating
servicemembers onto creditors and away from the
Department of Defense is inconsistent with the statutory text
and history, it is consistent with the predictions of regulatory
theory.
D. Expansion of Liability and the Rule of Lenity
The agencies’ aggressive expansions of theories of
liability under the SCRA are not only inconsistent with the
text and structure of the SCRA, but they are also inconsistent
with the rule of lenity. 340 The rule of lenity, a rule that “is
337. H.R. REP. NO. 108-81, at 39 (2003).
338. Compl. at 5, Sallie Mae, Inc., No. 1:99-mc-09999.
339. Id. at 4.
340. One might argue that the application of the rule of lenity to the SCRA is
inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s mandate that the SCRA be liberally
construed in favor of servicemembers. E.g., Boone, 319 U.S. at 575; LeMaistre
v. Leffers, 333 U.S. 1, 4–6 (1948). The Court’s jurisprudence however does not
justify departing from the meaning of the text itself. In Boone, the Court was
instructing that the “material effect” test should be interpreted liberally in favor
of servicemembers, even as the Court itself ruled against the servicemember.
Boone, 319 U.S. at 575. In LeMaistre, the Court rejected an argument that the
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perhaps not much less old than construction itself,” 341
requires a court to interpret ambiguous laws with criminal
penalties in favor of defendants, thereby giving fair warning
to potential defendants and narrowing potential criminal
liability. 342 In other words, the rule of lenity is a “basic axiom
of federal criminal jurisprudence” requiring “that a court
should adopt the harsher of two rational readings of a
criminal statute only when Congress has spoken in clear and
definite language.” 343
The SCRA, like its predecessors, is a “hybrid”
statute—providing for both civil and criminal penalties in
many of its provisions. 344 The application of the rule of lenity
to hybrid statutes like the SCRA has been the subject of much
But courts have increasingly embraced the
debate. 345
application of the rule of lenity to statutes that, like the
SCRA, provide for criminal penalties as well as other
potential consequences. And where a statute is susceptible to
multiple interpretations that might otherwise be acceptable,
the most limiting interpretation must apply in all
applications—because a single law must have a single
meaning in all contexts, and the “lowest common
text of the Act should be interpreted more narrowly than the text itself justified.
In the last sentence, and as a final explanation for why the Court would not
read the statute in a manner the text itself could not support, the Court cited
Boone. Neither case is incompatible with the application of the rule of lenity.
341. United States v. Wiltberger, 18 U.S. 76, 95 (1820).
342. E.g., C.I.R. v. Acker, 361 U.S. 87, 91 (1959); Keppel v. Tiffin Sav. Bank,
197 U.S. 356, 362 (1905) (“[A] person or corporation is not to be subjected to a
penalty unless the words of the statute plainly impose it.”).
343. Dan M. Kahan, Lenity and Federal Common Law Crimes, 1994 SUP. CT.
REV. 345, 345 (internal quotations omitted).
344. See 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 597-597a (providing for civil liability); 50 U.S.C.
app. §§ 521(c), 527(e), 531(c), 532(b), 533(d), 535(h), 536(e), 537(c) (providing for
criminal penalties).
345. See, e.g., Stephen Wills Murphy, The Rule of Lenity and Hybrid
Statutes: WEC Carolina Energy Solutions LLC v. Miller, 64 S.C. L. REV. 1129
(2013); Mark S. Popofsky, The Section 2 Debate: Should Lenity Play a Role?, 7
RUTGERS BUS. L.J. 1 (2010); Jonathan Marx, How To Construe A Hybrid
Statute, 93 VA. L. REV. 235 (2007); Jonathan R. Siegel, The Polymorphic
Principle and the Judicial Role in Statutory Interpretation, 84 TEX. L. REV. 339
(2005); Margaret V. Sachs, Harmonizing Civil and Criminal Enforcement of
Federal Regulatory Statutes: The Case of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 1025; Bryan T. Camp, Dual Construction of RICO: The
Road Not Taken in Reves, 51 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 61 (1994); Bruce A. Markell,
Bankruptcy, Lenity, and the Statutory Interpretation of Cognate Civil and
Criminal Statutes, 69 IND. L.J. 335, 336–37 (1994).
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denominator, as it were, must govern.” 346
United States v. Thompson/Center Arms 347 illustrates
the point. In Thompson/Center Arms, the Court had to
interpret an ambiguous provision of the National Firearms
Act that included both a civil tax penalty and a criminal
penalty. 348 The plurality opinion applied the rule of lenity,
reasoning that it “is a rule of statutory construction whose
purpose is to help give authoritative meaning to statutory
language. It is not a rule of administration calling for courts
to refrain in criminal cases from applying statutory language
that would have been held to apply if challenged in civil
litigation.” 349
The Court in Leocal v. Ashcroft 350 again raised the
application of the rule of lenity to hybrid statutes. In Leocal,
the Court addressed whether a DUI conviction was a “crime
of violence” under 18 U.S.C. § 16 and therefore an
“aggravated felony” under the Immigration and Nationality
Act that could serve as the basis for deportation. 351 The court
ultimately concluded that the term was unambiguous. 352 But
in dicta, the Court noted that if the term had lacked clarity, it
would have been constrained to interpret the term consistent
with the rule of lenity. 353 Although the court dealt with the
provision only in the deportation context, the Court noted
that “it has both criminal and noncriminal applications.
Because we must interpret the statute consistently, whether
we encounter its application in a criminal or noncriminal
context, the rule of lenity applies.” 354
The Supreme Court appeared again to invoke the rule
of lenity in a case involving the Sherman Act. In 2006, the
Court in Illinois Tool Works 355 overturned the presumption of
market power in antitrust patent tying cases. 356 In reaching
this decision, the Court contrasted “the normal rule of lenity
346.
347.
348.
349.
350.
351.
352.
353.
354.
355.
356.

Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 380 (2005) (collecting cases).
United States v. Thompson/Ctr. Arms, 504 U.S. 505 (1992).
Id. at 518.
Id. at 519 & n.10 (Scalia, J., concurring).
543 U.S. 1.
543 U.S. at 3.
Id. at 11–13.
Id. at 12 n.8.
Id.
Illinois Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28 (2006).
Id. at 31.
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that is applied in criminal cases” with what the Court termed
“a rule of severity for a special category of antitrust cases.” 357
The Court emphasized that the same text that would
establish civil liability under the Sherman Act also “makes
the conduct at issue a federal crime.” 358 Accordingly, the
Court adopted an interpretation that was consistent with the
rule of lenity.
Recent circuit court opinions have been even more
definitive in their analysis. In 2012, the Fourth Circuit in
WEC Carolina Energy Solutions LLC v. Miller 359 held that
the rule of lenity applies to both the civil and criminal
enforcement of a hybrid statute. 360 The court was faced with
conflicting interpretations of a provision in the Computer
Fraud and Abuse Act. 361 In explaining why it would adopt
the reading most favorable to the defendant, the court
explained that the statute must be interpreted in the same
way whether civil or criminal penalties were sought. 362 And,
because the rule of lenity would apply to criminal
prosecution, the rule of lenity must also dictate the
interpretation in civil proceedings. 363 Ruling in favor of the
defendant, the Fourth Circuit declined to follow a Ninth
Circuit decision interpreting the same statutory language in a
different way, reasoning that while “[t]he interpretation is
certainly plausible,” it is “not clearly warranted by the
statutory text. . . . Thus, faced with the option of two
interpretations, we yield to the rule of lenity and choose the
more obliging route.” 364
In 2013, the Sixth Circuit also raised the use of the
rule of lenity in the context of hybrid statutes. In Carter v.
Welles-Bowen Realty, Inc., 365 the court held that the
Department of Housing and Urban Development’s (HUD)
policy statement on title services companies paying fees to
real estate agents under the Real Estate Settlement
357. Id. at 45.
358. Id. at 42.
359. 687 F.3d 199 (4th Cir. 2012).
360. Id. at 204.
361. Id. at 203.
362. Id. at 204.
363. Id.
364. Id. at 205–06 (declining to follow U.S. v. Nosal, 642 F.3d 781 (9th Cir.
2011), rev’d en banc, 676 F.3d 854 (9th Cir. 2012)).
365. 736 F.3d 722 (2013).
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Procedures Act—a hybrid statute that provides for both civil
and criminal penalties—was not entitled to deference. 366
Although he wrote the opinion for the unanimous panel,
Judge Sutton also authored a concurrence addressing the
interplay between Chevron deference and the rule of lenity.
Judge Sutton noted that HUD’s position on deference “would
allow one administration to criminalize conduct within the
scope of the ambiguity, the next administration to
decriminalize it, and the third to recriminalize it, all without
any direction from Congress.” 367 Rejecting this view, he
argued that a statute “is not a chameleon,” and its meaning
does not change depending on the type of action in which it is
raised. 368 Judge Sutton concluded that “[a]gencies, no less
than courts, must honor the rule of lenity.” 369
The DOJ’s and federal banking agencies’ application of
a strict liability theory to the SCRA, and the agencies’
aggressively expansive interpretations of the statutory text,
are fundamentally inconsistent with the rule of lenity. As
discussed above, in many cases the agencies have adopted
interpretations of the statute that are inconsistent with the
text of the statute itself. In such cases, creditors have not
received fair warning that conduct inconsistent with the
agencies’ new positions could result in liability. And even if
the agencies’ positions could be viewed as reasonable
interpretations of the statute, the rule of lenity would
mandate that the interpretation more favorable to the
defendant must be applied.
But while the agencies’
interpretations are inconsistent with the rule of lenity, they
are consistent with predicted agency behavior in light of
observed bureaucratic tendencies. The departure from the
rule of lenity is one more example of the agencies succumbing
to the pathologies predicted by regulatory theory.
IV.

THE COSTS OF UPSETTING THE BALANCE

While the agencies’ SCRA enforcement actions
illustrate bureaucratic tendencies toward expansive and
aggressive interpretations of the laws the agencies administer
366.
367.
368.
369.

Id. at 726.
Id. at 729 (Sutton, J., concurring).
Id. at 730.
Id. at 736.
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and seeking to maximize financial recoveries, the
enforcement actions also illustrate the observed limitations of
administrative agencies in evaluating the marginal costs and
benefits of their actions and a bias toward short-term goals.
Regulatory theory predicts that agencies will be limited in
their abilities to evaluate marginal benefits of their actions. 370
This limitation may be more pronounced in enforcement
actions, where the agencies’ actions are not informed by the
notice and comment rulemaking process. The agencies’
enforcement actions create significant potential costs to
consumers generally and servicemembers in particular. 371
There is no indication that the agencies considered these
costs or how the agencies evaluated them.
One potential cost of the agencies’ expansive
imposition of liability in the SCRA enforcement actions seems
rather obvious. When costs are imposed on a company, the
company will generally pass those costs on to its customers,
often in the form of higher prices. This may be particularly
true when the company competes in a market with imperfect
competition, a trait common to most markets. 372 Thus, when
a financial institution is penalized for alleged non-compliance
with the SCRA, the cost of that penalty may be passed on to
consumers. The net result is that consumers ultimately bear
the price of the penalty imposed by the agency. 373 In the case
of the agencies’ SCRA enforcement actions, this means that
consumers, including other servicemembers, who remained
current on their financial obligations may pay the price for
the hundreds of millions of dollars the agencies have required
to be paid to servicemembers who did not remain current on
their obligations—even where there is no indication that
370. See supra Part I.C.
371. E.g., Andrew L. Sandler & Kirk D. Jensen, Disparate Impact in Fair
Lending: A Theory Without a Basis & the Law of Unintended Consequences, 33
BANKING & FIN. SERVS. POL. REP. 18 (2014) (discussing unintended costs
resulting from aggressive interpretation of fair lending laws).
372. E.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., “No Soul to Damn: No Body to Kick”: An
Unscandalized Inquiry into the Problem of Corporate Punishment, 79 MICH. L.
REV. 386, 402 (1981) (“If the corporation competes in a product market
characterized by imperfect competition (a trait of most of the ‘real world’), then
the fine may be recovered from consumers in the form of higher prices.”).
373. E.g., Gregory M. Gilchrist, The Special Problem of Banks and Crime, U.
COLO. L. REV. 1, 26 (2014) (noting that consumers in general may be harmed
when banks are penalized because the costs of the penalties are ultimately
passed to the consumer).
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military service in any way affected the servicemember’s
ability to comply with the obligation. Ensuring low cost
financial products for consumers generally falls outside the
jurisdiction of the agencies that have enforced the SCRA, 374 so
it would be no surprise if it was not fully or adequately
evaluated.
Additionally, the agencies’ expansive interpretations of
the SCRA through enforcement action increase the risk that
creditors may be less willing to lend to servicemembers. The
concern that an absolute moratorium on actions against
servicemembers would negatively impact the availability of
credit to servicemembers was a primary reason the drafters of
the original SSCRA adopted the balancing of interests over
In referring to moratory
the moratorium approach. 375
legislation as “mistaken kindness” to servicemembers, the
House Committee on the Judiciary’s report explained that the
Committee was concerned that “if there were a total
prohibition upon enforcing obligations against one in military
service, the credit of a soldier and his family would be utterly
cut off. No one could be found who would extend them
credit.” 376 Continued access to credit may be even more
important to a servicemember and his or her family at a time
of activation, particularly in cases where a servicemember’s
military income may be significantly less than the
servicemember’s civilian income had been.
Although the agencies’ expansive interpretations of
SCRA provisions and imposition of liability on a strict
liability theory are not the same as effecting a complete
moratorium on actions against servicemembers, the agencies’
actions still create negative incentives for creditors. The
374. E.g., Professor Adam J. Levitin, Testimony Before the United States
Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs on Enhanced
Consumer Financial Protection After the Financial Crisis 2–4 (July 19, 2011)
(asserting that the federal banking agencies’ focus was on the safety and
soundness of financial institutions, and that consumer protection is not a
primary role of the banking regulators). The CFPB, which has consumer
protection as its primary focus, does not have jurisdiction over the SCRA. See
12 U.S.C. §§ 5581–87; see also Hollister K. Petraeus, Protecting Military
Families, 38 THE REPORTER 235, 238 (2011) (noting that Congress did not give
the CFPB jurisdiction over the SCRA).
375. H.R. REP. NO. 181 (1917), reprinted in 55 CONG. REC. 7789 (1917); see
also 55 CONG. REC. 7787 (Statement of Rep. Webb) (noting that a rigid
moratorium would “disturb the soldier’s credit probably in many cases.”).
376. Id.
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agencies’ enforcement actions have placed creditors on notice
that they will face substantial penalties for noncompliance
with the SCRA. But creditors are also now aware that this
liability will be imposed on a strict liability theory, so that no
amount of due diligence, compliance efforts, or good
intentions may shield the creditor from liability. Indeed, the
agencies’ guidance in the foreclosure-related file reviews have
placed creditors familiar with those standards on notice that
liability may be imposed even when the creditor relied on
information provided by the Department of Defense
indicating that a debtor was not eligible for SCRA
protections. 377
The agencies’ actions to compensate servicemembers
under the agencies’ expansive theories also raise issues of
moral hazard. Government actions that make it more
difficult and more expensive for creditors to take actions
against delinquent consumers create incentives—or at least
remove disincentives—for consumers to default on their
obligations. 378 For example, a consumer may choose to stop
making mortgage payments if the consumer believes he or
she may be able to continue living in the property rent-free
and pocket the savings. 379 Similarly, scholars have shown
how foreclosure rates are two to three-times higher in states
with anti-deficiency laws (i.e., laws that prohibit a creditor
from seeking from a debtor the amount owed beyond the
value of the collateral). 380 In such states, consumers may
rationally conclude that the lack of ongoing personal liability
for the mortgage loan after foreclosure makes foreclosure a
less unattractive option. Moral hazard issues also arise
under the positions taken by the agencies in their
enforcement actions. For example, if a servicemember can
377. See supra notes 259–66 and accompanying text.
378. Similarly, scholars have argued that government action to modify the
consequences of lending practices can raise moral hazard issues with respect to
lenders. E.g., George Lipsitz, “In an Avalanche Every Snowflake Pleads Not
Guilty”: The Collateral Consequences of Mass Incarceration and Impediments to
Women’s Fair Housing Rights, 59 UCLA L. REV. 1746, 1787 (2012).
379. E.g., Todd Zywicki, Economic Uncertainty, the Courts, and the Rule of
Law, 35 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 195, 211–12 (2012); see also Editorial, Dukes of
Moral Hazard, WALL ST. J., Feb. 19, 2009, at A18.
380. E.g., Zywicki, supra note 379, at 211; Lawrence D. Jones, Deficiency
Judgments and the Exercise of the Default Option in Home Mortgage Loans, 36
J.L. & ECON. 115, 135 (1993).
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benefit from the SCRA’s default judgment protection by not
making an appearance even if the servicemember has actual
notice of the proceeding, why bother seeking a stay? 381 Or if a
servicemember believes that he or she may receive
substantial (i.e., six-figure) monetary compensation for a
mortgage servicer’s technical violation of the SCRA’s default
judgment protection, a servicemember may have an incentive
to gamble that a servicer may get it wrong rather than work
with the mortgage servicer to resolve the debt in a less risky
way, such as through a loan modification.
This lack of evidence regarding a cost-benefit analysis
is consistent with the predictions of regulatory theory
discussed above. For example, while the risk of limitations on
credit availability to servicemembers is real, maintaining
available credit to servicemembers is not within the
regulatory mission of the DOJ or the federal banking
agencies. 382 Similarly, the negative consequences of moral
hazard may impact individual servicemembers, but generally
falls outside these agencies’ regulatory mandate. So it is not
surprising that these risks would not factor into the agencies’
decisions regarding the positions it has taken in its SCRA
enforcement actions. The apparent omission of any costbenefit analysis including such longer-term costs is consistent
with the short-term bias (of providing financial recovery of
servicemembers the agencies viewed as aggrieved), a tunnel
vision-type focus on its regulatory mission (taking action
against perceived violations of the SCRA), and a limited
ability to evaluate costs outside agencies’ area of expertise
(costs to other consumers, reduced credit availability to
servicemembers, and moral hazard).
CONCLUSION
“Support the troops” has long been a national rallying
cry. In recent years, this rallying cry has been raised more
and more in the context of consumer financial services. 383

381. See supra note 273 and accompanying text.
382. See supra note 374.
383. E.g., Jacqueline S. Atkins, Lending to the Military, 64 CONSUMER FIN. L.
Q. REP. 145 (2010); Steven M. Graves & Christopher L. Peterson, Predatory
Lending and the Military: The Law and Geography of “Payday” Loans in
Military Towns, 66 OHIO ST. L.J. 653 (2005).
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This call recognizes the important contributions and
tremendous sacrifices servicemembers make in defending our
nation and its freedoms. And this rallying cry has been
extended to the families of servicemembers, who also sacrifice
when the servicemember is on active duty. 384
For decades, the SCRA has provided important
procedural and substantive rights to servicemembers and
their families regarding consumer financial products and
services. For many years, these protections were interpreted
by the financial services industry and financial services
regulators consistent with the text and purposes of the Act.
This changed suddenly and dramatically in the recent and
extensive series of enforcement actions. In these enforcement
actions, the enforcement agencies have taken many expansive
and aggressive positions inconsistent with the text and
purposes of the SCRA—and, in some cases, with the agencies’
own prior guidance.
Whether one agrees or not with the sentiment
underlying the positions taken in these enforcement actions,
these actions provide further evidence of the bureaucratic
tendencies predicted by regulatory theorists. Regulatory
theory posits that administrative agencies will seek to expand
their reach and the application of the statutes they
administer, subject to the constraints and incentives created
by their operational framework and various external
pressures. Given the sympathetic nature of servicemembers,
and the widespread negative perception of the financial
services industry, it is not surprising that enforcement
agencies would feel relatively unrestrained in how they
interpret and enforce the SCRA. And this sentiment has
been dramatically displayed in the agencies’ enforcement of
the SCRA in recent years. Other predilections and cognitive
biases observed by regulatory theorists in other contexts can
also be observed in SCRA enforcement actions.
Understanding the impact these tendencies and biases
have on agency decision making is a necessary first step in
improving that decision making. While it is possible that
enforcement agencies might make similar decisions without
384. E.g.,
THE
WHITE
HOUSE,
Joining
Forces,
http://www.whitehouse.gov/joiningforces (last visited Feb. 3, 2014) (“When our
troops serve, their families are serving, too.”).
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the influence of these tendencies, such an outcome is hardly
guaranteed. As discussed above, a careful review of the
history and purpose of the SCRA, the text of the Act
implementing that purpose, and the potential costs that arise
from an overly expansive interpretation of the statute,
strongly support an argument that the agencies should adopt
different interpretations of the SCRA than they have in
recent years. Agency enforcement actions would be better
informed and more defensible if these regulatory tendencies
are appropriately considered and transparently addressed.

